

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1215560-1

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Routing Slip
FD-4 (Rev. 6-14-56)

Date 1/15/59

To

☒ Director

Att. FOREIGN LIAISON DESK FILE #

☐ SAC

Title

☐ ASAC

☐ Supv.

☐ Agent

☐ SE

☐ CC

☐ Steno

☐ Clerk

ACTION DESIRED

☐ Acknowledge

☐ Assign Reassign

☐ Bring file

☐ Call me

☐ Correct

☐ Deadline

☐ Deadline passed

☐ Delinquent

☐ Expedite

☐ File

☐ Initial & return

☐ Leads need attention

☐ Open Case

☐ Return with explanation or notation as to action taken.

☐ Prepare lead cards

☐ Prepare tickler

☐ Recharge serials

☐ Return assignment card

☐ Return file

☐ Return serials

☐ Search and return

☐ See me

☐ Send Serials

to

☐ Submit new charge-out

☐ Submit report by

☐ Type

Embassy Weeka #2 1/13/59

60267 NLS/BCE/AK 1014-99

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4/7/99 BY 60267 NLS/BCE/AK

~~XXXX~~ James
Legat

Office Havana

☐ See reverse side

1300

February 3, 1959

CODE

CABLEGRAM

URGENT

EX-135

TO LEGAT HAVANA

REC-69

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (109-12-210) - 421

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA; INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA. ON JANUARY THREE ZERO LAST CATHERINE TAAFFE ADVISED NEW YORK OFFICE THAT ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, HEAD OF SUGAR INDUSTRY, CUBA, ^{STATED} THAT CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAD SET UP GAMBLING COMMISSION WHICH WOULD REVIEW APPLICATIONS FOR GAMBLING LICENSES. COMMISSION WANTS TO CHECK ON TYPE OF PEOPLE LICENSES ISSUED TO, AND FERNANDEZ ANXIOUS TO DETERMINE IF LIAISON COULD BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN CUBAN GOVERNMENT AND FBI SO THAT COMMISSION COULD REQUEST CHECKS OF BUREAU CONCERNING U. S. CITIZENS APPLYING FOR LICENSES OR CONCERNING CUBANS WHO HAD BEEN IN U. S. MRS. TAAFFE WAS ADVISED ANY REQUEST OF THIS NATURE SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH OFFICIAL CHANNELS WHICH WOULD BE THE U. S. EMBASSY IN HAVANA OR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IN WASHINGTON, D. C.

VHN:JLW
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4/7/99 BY 60267 NLS/BCE/PK 101497

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route thru for review)

NOTE: NR Cable goes via State Department leased line
at no cost to Bureau.

ENC. 2285-2314 BY 6

CK. 0004-0015 BY CMA

DeLoach
McGuire
W.C. Sullivan

APPROVED BY

TYPED BY

FILED BY

MAIL ROOM

Nelson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

1959

FILED BY Sent via Cable 2-3-59- 7:53 PM PER: US.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: January 30, 1959

FROM : MR. D. E. MOORE *DM*SUBJECT: CUBAN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA60267 NLS/BC/PRK 10-14-49
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/7/99 BY 60267 NLS/BC/PRKcc Mr. Belmont
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Roach
Mr. Donahoe
Mr. NascaTolson _____
Belmont _____
DeLoach _____
McGuire _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
W.C. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Supervisor McDonnell, New York Office, advised 1:35 PM, 1-30-59, that Catherine Taaffe contacted the NYO this afternoon and advised that she had received a call from Alberto Fernandez, head of the sugar industry in Cuba and member of the Cuban Cabinet, early this afternoon and Fernandez had advised her that at a Cabinet meeting on the evening of January 29th, the Cuban government had set up a gambling commission which will review applications for gambling licenses. Fernandez said that the commission wants to be able to check on the type of people they issue licenses to and, therefore, he was anxious to find out if liaison could be set up between the Cuban government and the FBI so that the commission could request checks of the FBI concerning U.S. citizens applying for licenses or concerning Cubans who had been in the United States. McDonnell said that no advice had been given Mrs. Taaffe and he questioned the advisability of establishing any such liaison, at least at this time.

OBSERVATIONS:

The Cuban situation is still very unsettled. It is believed that before we should even give consideration to such a request, it should come through official channels and we would have to know who the information would be given to and how it would be handled before we would even consider establishing any official liaison. It is, therefore, believed that Mrs. Taaffe should be advised that any request of this nature should be made through official channels which for the United States would be the U.S. Embassy in Havana or the Department of State in Washington.

ACTION:

EX-135 REC-69

11 FEB 5 1959

It is recommended that Mrs. Taaffe be advised in accordance with the above and if you approve, New York will be so instructed. We will also advise the Legal Attache in Havana of the inquiry received and the advice given Mrs. Taaffe.

DEM:td (6)

Yes ✓ *Sup Mr. McDonnell*
NYO, advised
2/2/59 - ocm

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FEB 6 1959

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/7/99 BY 60207N8/BCE/SP

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. McGuire	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Trotter	
Mr. Sullivan	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

REC-68

URGENT 2/6/59 1-39 PM TOM

TO DIRECTOR FBI

FROM SAC MIAMI 1 P

CUBAN POLITICAL MATTERS, FPM DASH CUBA, MARIANO FAGET, FORMER CHIEF
OF BUREAU FOR REPRESSION COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES, CUBA, ADVISED FEB.

SIX INSTANT THAT HAVANA QUOTE "RADIO VOICE UNQUOTE ANNOUNCED FOUR DAYS
AGO THAT JUAN MARINELLO, PRESIDENT OF CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY, KNOWN AS
POPULAR SOCIALIST PARTY, HAD BEEN REINSTATED AS PROFESSOR IN TEACHERS
COLLEGE OF UNIVERSITY OF HAVANA. FAGET SAID THIS MORNING SAME RADIO

STATION ANNOUNCED THAT MARINELLO WAS DEPARTING FEB. SIX INSTANT
FOR MOSCOW VIA PARIS FOR TALKS WITH COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS CONCERNING
CUBAN SITUATION. SUGGEST BUREAU REQUEST LEGAT, HAVANA, TO VERIFY.

END AND ACK PLS

WA 1-43 PM OK FBI WA AR

TU DISC

Mr. Belmont

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

64-200-210-
64-21981-

REC-68

109-12-210-424

BEING DISSEMINATED

TO DIRECTOR

DEPT.

2-11-59

Mr. Tolson

109-12-210

Case No Havana
2-6-59
Ed 10 Section 15-2-6
2-6-59
EX-132

ce Me

m • UNIT

OVERNMENT

Director, FBI

DATE: February 4, 1959

FROM : Legal Attache, Havana (64-794)

SUBJECT: Colonel JOSE REGO RUBIDO
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTER - CUBA

Re Legat, Madrid letter to Bureau January 5, 1959.

For a short period after the revolution on January 1, 1959, in Cuba, Colonel JOSE REGO RUBIDO was Chief of the Armed Forces; however, about January 20, 1959, he was assigned as Cuban Military Attache to Brazil.

Extra copies of this letter are being furnished for the attention of the Legal Attache, Madrid.

RUC

4 - Bureau
1 - Havana
JTH:lg
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/7/99 BY 60210MS/BCE/KSB

EX-100

REC-91

101-12-2

428

FEB 10 1959

FEB 3 5 21 PM '59

RECORDED

NAT. INT. SEC.

108 FEB 19 1959

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Mohr

2-11-59

CODE

CABLEGRAM

URGENT

TO LEGAL ATTACHE HAVANA
FROM DIRECTOR FBI (109-12-210)
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA. CURRENT NEWS DISPATCH
INDICATES CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN CUBA REDUCING AGE LIMIT
FOR PRESIDENCY TO THIRTY YEARS AND SPECIAL PROVISION DECLARING
GUEVARA IS CUBAN BY BIRTH, ALTHOUGH BORN IN ARGENTINA. ARTICLE
INDICATES BOTH GUEVARA AND CASTRO NOW ELIGIBLE FOR PRESIDENCY.
BE ALERT TO ADVISE BUREAU PROMPTLY OF ANY INDICATION THAT
GUEVARA BEING GROOMED FOR PRESIDENCY OR ANY RESPONSIBLE
POSITION IN CURRENT GOVERNMENT IN VIEW OF HIS COMMUNIST
BACKGROUND.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/7/99 BY 60267NIS/bc/klp

SBD:dmd
(7)

1 - 105-19305 (Guevara)

Note: Cover memorandum S.B. Donahoe to A.H. Belmont, 2-10-59,
same caption, SBD:bcf.

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route thru for review)

REC- 28

NR. 327

ENC. 1-1-2 BY

CK. 1821-1826 BY

APPROVED BY

TYPED BY

FILED BY

03 FEB 16 1959

19 FEB 12 1959

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Nease _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Clayton _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM

Sent via cable 2/11/59 LP NM

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

DECODED COPY

☐ Airgram☒ Cablegram

☒ Tolson
☒ Belmont
☒ Mohr
☒ Nease
☒ Parsons
☒ Rosen
☒ Tamm
☒ Trotter
☒ W.C. Sullivan
☒ Tele. Room
☒ Holloman
☒ Gandy

DeLoach
 McGuire
 W.C. Sullivan

URGENT 2-6-59

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LEGAT, HAVANA NO. 610

CUBAN POLITICAL MATTERS. [] ADVISED THIS DATE CUBAN
 GOVERNMENT MONITORING INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS. []
 LOCALLY STATES GOVERNMENT ALSO MONITORING SOME LOCAL CALLS.

b7D

b7E

JAMES T. HAVERTY

RECEIVED: 2-6-59 5:46 PM HJT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 4/7/99 BY 60267 MB/BCE/105

EX 105

cc: Mr. Roach
 cc: Mr. Belmont
 cut

REC-53

107-12-210

430

FEB 13 1959

63 FEB 19 1959

107-12-210

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: February 12, 1959

FROM : Mr. J. A. Sizoo

SUBJECT: CUBAN POLITICAL MATTERS

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 DeLoach _____
 McGuire _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

By cablegram dated February 6, 1959, the Havana Office advised that an informant had told them that the Cuban Government was monitoring international telephone calls. [redacted]

[redacted] had also advised the Legat that the Cuban Government was also monitoring some local calls. A teletype was sent to Miami dated February 11, 1959, furnishing them this information. The Director has asked, "Why did we wait so long before alerting Miami?"

At the outset, we should have placed a note on the yellow of the deferred radiogram going to Miami for the information of the Director and other Bureau officials to the effect that Miami had previously been alerted on July 10, 1958, that all telephone calls to and from Cuba were being monitored by the Cuban Government. Because of this previous alert, we did not consider this an urgent matter and take action on the copy of the cable from Havana but waited for the original to be routed down. The original of this cablegram was received in this Division on February 9, routed to Nationality Intelligence Section, and then to Liaison Section where it was received on February 10. It was believed desirable as a precaution to realert the Miami Office to this situation. Consequently a deferred radiogram was dictated. It was typed by the stenographer on the afternoon of the 10th of February, and dated February 11 and sent up on February 11.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 4/7/99 BY 60267 NLS/BCE/KOB

ACTION:

Had we placed a note on the yellow of the communication going to Miami it would have been clear why this matter was handled by deferred radiogram. (It was later changed to a teletype due to radio facilities being out of operation for messages to Miami.) We will be alert to do this in the future.

REC- 53

53 FEB 18 1959

3 FEB 13 1959

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Donahoe
- 1 - Mr. Cleveland
- 1 - Mr. Roach

JAS:mtb
 (6)

EX 105

and meantime an
 entirely new good
 had taken over!

431

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Political Matters - Cuba

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/7/99 BY 60267NLS/BCE/KOB

Mr. Tolson ☒
Mr. Belmont ☒
Mr. DeLoach ☒
Mr. McGuire ☒
Mr. Mohr ☐
Mr. Parsons ☐
Mr. Rosen ☐
Mr. Tamm ☐
Mr. Trotter ☐
Mr. Jones ☐
Mr. W.C. Sullivan ☐
Tele. Room ☐
Mr. Holloman ☐
Miss Holmes ☐
Miss Gandy ☐

File
109-12-210

109-12-210-

NOT RECORDED

14 FEB 18 1959

ENCLOSURE

5-22

Noted
Cof

144
FEB 18 1959

1 -
1 - Mr. Estill
1 - Yellow

CODE

~~RADIOGRAM~~ TELETYPE

2-11-59
Changed to Teletype per MNC
per Mr Estill max
DEFERRED

TO SAC MIAMI

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

CUBAN POLITICAL MATTERS. INFORMATION RECEIVED THAT CUBAN
GOVERNMENT IS MONITORING INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS.
ASSUME FOR SECURITY REASONS THAT ANY CALL YOU MAKE TO THE
HAVANA OFFICE IS BEING MONITORED.

WEE:jaw
(4)

10)E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/17/99 BY 60267 MS/bce

NR. 117242

ENC. 7747-7746 BY HU

CK. 2332-2338 BY

APPROVED BY

TYPED BY

FILED BY

433

TELETYPE

FEB 11 1959

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

16
8 P JHM.

OOM

F B I

Date: 2/11/59

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Parsons _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tamm _____
Mr. Trotter _____
Mr. W.C. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO (97-1017)

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA
IS - CUBA

Attached hereto are six copies of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.

The information contained therein was furnished by _____ (U)

The attached letterhead memorandum is classified "~~Confidential~~" since it involves investigative coverage of a foreign diplomatic establishment and the information furnished by the informant could reasonably result in the identification of an informant of continuing value and jeopardize the future effectiveness thereof.

- 4 - Bureau (Encls. 6)
(1-65-47134) (EMBASSY OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC)
2 - WFO
(1-65-3731) (EMBASSY OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC)

HJM:lss
(6)

4/7/99
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 NLS/BCE/KRB
DECLASSIFY ON: 1-1-80
TO STATE, CIA & Dept.

AIRTEL

Approved: Z. J. Boardman
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

109-12-210

b7E

65-47134-
UNCLASSIFIED COPY FILED IN 65-47134-



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington 25, D. C.
February 11, 1959

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

EMBASSY OF DOM REP.

On February 10, 1959, a confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Dominican Third Secretary Ernesto Juillo Perez Bonetti had received the following information from an individual known only to the informant as [redacted] (phonetic), [redacted]

[redacted] in the Washington, D. C. area. DOM. REP. D.C.

[redacted] had apparently driven his automobile to Miami, Florida, on December 18, 1958, where he left this vehicle. He thereafter traveled to Cuba and returned to the United States on February 7, 1959. D.C. FLA

[redacted] was glad he had not taken his automobile to Cuba, because according to [redacted] the Cuban rebels had "grabbed" every automobile bearing United States license plates. This was done since the rebels were sure that such automobiles belonged to former Cuban Senator Rolando Masferrer. EMPLOYED AT

[redacted] further advised that it was a shock to awaken on January 1, 1959, and find Cuba with no government. He stated that there was very little looting except for the gambling casinos. [redacted] further stated that the Cuban rebels hunted the followers of Masferrer and killed them. CUBA

Prior to leaving Cuba, [redacted] was investigated thoroughly and was relieved of all money with the exception of \$50. 4/7/99

This memorandum is loaned to you by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and neither it nor its contents are to be distributed outside the agency to which loaned.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED BY 60602/LS/BCE/RYS
DECLASSIFIED ON 25X

AGENCY 1cc - Subj. [redacted]
REQ. REC'D
DATE 2-13-59
NOV 1959
BY [redacted]

107-12-810-444

ENCLOSURE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: *February 10, 1959*

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/7/99 BY 102/JM

SUBJECT: *FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA*

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Nease _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
W.C. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

John
Squire
C. Sullivan

In connection with article in The Washington Daily News, 2-9-59, bearing headline "Reds Rebuilding Fences in Cuba" the Director commented he had heard on radio this morning that Cuba changed its constitution so as to enable Guevara to become Cuban citizen and eligible for Presidency of Cuba.

The Washington Daily News, 2-10-59, carries news story from Havana by its editor, John T. O'Rourke, indicating Cuban cabinet has voted to rescind constitutional requirements relating to age limits for presidential candidates and has voted to reduce age limit to 30 years. Previous limit not shown. Castro is 32 and article indicates he was behind the change.

This story also indicates United Press International (news service) in a dispatch filed later said constitutional change would make both Castro and Ernesto Guevara eligible for presidency. Dispatch pointed out Guevara was made eligible by special provision declaring he is "Cuban by birth" even though he was born in Argentina. This makes him what is known as "an honorary native" of Cuba. News articles attached.

ACTION:

For information. Attached is cable to Legal Attache, Havana, alerting him to this information and instructing that he advise Bureau promptly of any indication that Guevara being groomed for presidency or any other responsible office.

SBD:bcf
(7)

cc - 1 - Nasca ✓
1 - Donahoe
1 - Belmont
1 - W. C. Sullivan
1 - DeLoach

cc: 105-19305 (Guevara)
Enclosures 2

EX 105

ENCLOSURE

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

DO-7

FROM

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TO

OFFICIAL INDICATED BELOW BY CHECK MARK

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Parsons _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tamm _____
Mr. Trotter _____
Mr. W. C. Sullivan _____
Mr. Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

See Me _____
Note and Return _____
Prepare Reply _____
For Your Recommendation _____
What are the facts? _____
Remarks: _____

I heard on radio this morning that Cuba changed its Constitution so as to enable

Guerrillas to become Cuban citizens & eligible for the Presidency of Cuba.

Downloaded to Belmont 2-10-59 SBD:haf 109-12-210

H.

5-42

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/7/99 BY 60267NS/BCE/MD

EX 105

REC-13

FEB 18 1959

Cuban Constitution Changed

Castro Is Eligible for President

By JOHN T. O'ROURKE

Editor of The Washington Daily News

HAVANA, Feb. 10.—Fidel Castro, Cuba's revolutionary boss, has made himself legally eligible to the Presidency of Cuba, regardless of what the Cuban constitution used to say.

Dr. Castro, who has declared he "wanted only to re-establish the constitution as the basis of Cuba's government and had no personal ambitions beyond overturning Fulgencio Batista's brutal tyranny, has caused hand-picked ministers to rescind provisions in the constitution which would have prevented him from being a candidate for the presidency. These provisions relate to age. Dr. Castro is 32.

ACTION IGNORED

The cabinet has voted to rescind the constitutional requirements and also has voted that the age limit be reduced to 30 years. Actually, the whole cabinet quietly took action approximately 15 days ago but since action referred to the article only by number and failed to explain or describe the effect, it was generally overlooked or ignored by the Cuban press and radio.

This happened at about the time Dr. Castro said there would be an election in 18 months or two years, disclaiming presidential ambitions for himself with the statement, "If I really wanted presidency why would I wait 18 months?"

The action may or may not explain Dr. Castro's remarks—depending on the interpretation.

TWO VIEWPOINTS

One official said, "Since he makes the decisions, it would be better for him to have executive responsibility."

There is no doubt the decisions of Provisional President Manuel Urrutia and the Cabinet depend on Dr. Castro's approval. The implication of the foregoing is that elections will be held as soon as possible—consonant with Dr. Castro's certain victory.

Another interpretation is that since Dr. Castro clearly intends to run the country and the danger of unconstitutional maneuvers may increase, it is best to give a semblance of legality to the actual head of the state. Therefore it is wisest to provide legal prerogatives as fast as possible to enable him to run for office and get elected if he is able to do so.

No doubt, Mr. Castro would be elected if he ran today, as own remarks acknowledged—"If it were legally possible." It is now legally possible insofar as the revolutionary de facto government can make it so.

"CHE" ELIGIBLE, TOO

A Havana dispatch by the United Press International, filed after Mr. O'Rourke's news story was received here, said publication of Cuba's interim constitution revealed today both Dr. Castro and

Dr. Ernesto ("Che") Guevara, his Argentine lieutenant, are eligible for the presidency.

It also said the interim constitution is to remain in force until elections are held sometime in 1960, and pointed out Dr. Guevara was made eligible for the presidency by a special provision declaring he is "Cuban by birth," altho he actually was born in Argentina. This makes him what is known as "an honorary native of Cuba."

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS, Tuesday, February 10, 1959

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

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DATE 4/7/99 BY 60301MS/CE/168 ENCLOSURE

107-12-10-435

File 5.18

Cause of Real Concern

Reds Rebuilding Fences in Cuba

By EDWARD TOMLINSON

The tumult and shouting that accompanied the revolution has subsided somewhat and now responsible Cuban business and professional men, particularly foreign investors, are deeply worried over the resurgence of communism in the sugar-rich island.

Members of the provisional administration of President Manuel Urrutia, and rebel boss Fidel Castro have stoutly denied it. But there no longer seems to be any doubt that the "comrades" had thoroughly infiltrated "The 26th of July Movement" which overthrew the regime of strongman Fulgencio Batista.

FULL BLOOM

The People's Socialist Party, the name under which the communists operate in Cuba, has sprung once again into full bloom. Moreover it has rushed a delegate to the Soviet Union to report to the Kremlin on the part played by the "faithful" in the bloody civil war.

Sivero Aguirre, member of the People's Socialist National Committee, told the Twenty-first Communist Party Congress in Moscow last week that "the communists were in the first ranks of the insurgents. The Party, working underground," he declared, "actually launched the struggle for unification of all the Cuban revolutionary forces in the campaign against the dictatorship."

OPPOSED

It is no secret that President Urrutia and most members of his cabinet strongly oppose any such collaboration with the Reds. But at the moment they do not control the guns nor the statements of military leaders, much less exercise any influence over the various agencies of communication of which the communists are making free use.

Such men as Juan Mariello, head of the Party, Blas

Roca and Lazaro Pena have launched a furious campaign against "Yankee imperialism," their favorite whipping boy over the years, calling upon the Cubans to "rescue the island from the exploiting North Americans."

But most of our people are less concerned about the public declarations and denunciations in Havana than they are about the less publicized and subversive activities of the anti-American elements out over the country.

KEY POSITIONS

Even before the Fidelista or rebel forces took over the capital, avowed communist labor goons seized key positions in many of the Havana locals and took over five of the 22 seats on the Executive Council of the powerful National Confederation of Labor.

Castro has since said he kicked them all out of the headquarters of the Federation as well as official positions in the different unions in the capital. But reports from other cities indicate that professional agitators from the outside are manipulating unions in some of the largest sugar centrals and mining towns.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/89 BY 60326 JNS/PCJ/103

File 5-44

101 43

DECODED COPY

✓
Tolson ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr ✓
Nease ✓
Parsons ✓
Rosen ✓
Tamm ✓
Trotter ✓
W.C. Sullivan ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Holloman ✓
Gandy ✓

DeLoach ✓
McGuire ✓
W.C. Sullivan ✓

☐ Airgram

☒ Cablegram

DEFERRED 2-14-59

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LEGAT, HAVANA NO. 617

CUBAN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. APPOINTMENT OF FIDEL CASTRO AS PRIME MINISTER LAST NIGHT MAY LEAD TO MORE RAPID REORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT. PREVIOUSLY, ALTHOUGH CASTRO WAS IN FACT HEAD OF GOVERNMENT, HE TOOK NO BLAME FOR GOVERNMENT ACTIONS. ALTHOUGH ALL CABINET MEMBERS ALSO RESIGNED, IT IS BELIEVED THEY WILL BE REINSTATED.

JAMES T. HAVERTY

RECEIVED VIA WESTERN UNION: 2-14-59 3:37 PM CWA

REC- 58

EX - 133

 107-12-210-436
23 FEB 17 1959

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/24/82 BY SP-1032/PSK

cc: Mr. Roach
cc: Mr. Belmont
CWA

66 FEB 20 1959 55

107-12-210

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch2-12, 1959

☐ Name Check Unit - Room 6523
☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
☐ Forward to File Review
☒ Attention Martin
☒ Return to Nason 1537
 Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:

☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☒ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☐ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
☐ Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

☐ Restricted to Locality of _____
☒ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations
☐ Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

Subject

b6

Birthdate & Place

b7C

Address

Localities

R#

Date

2-12

Searcher

Initials

Em

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

NRRP2-1485-3388

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Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch2 12, 1959

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Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch2-12, 1959

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Localities

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<u>NP</u>	<u>25-302037</u>
	<u>109-480-966^{NP} encl p3 1330 1310</u>
<u>NP</u>	<u>64-175-202-4</u>
<u>NP</u>	<u>109-12-210-205 p1</u>
	<u>64-330-211-855</u>
	<u>62-80750-572</u>

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DATE 4/7/99BY 60267 NLS/BCE/KPB

2-12, 1959

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☒ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☐ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
☐ Main _____ References Only

☐ Restricted to Locality of _____
☒ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations
☐ Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

Address

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Localities

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64-5003-1264 pl.

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DATE 4/7/99 BY 602671

BY 602607MS BUE K5

For Informational Purposes Only

The originals removed from this file and replaced with duplicate copies of the original were accessioned to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) pursuant to the JFK Records Collection Act of 1992. Provision of the JFK Act allowed for certain information to be postponed from public release until the year 2017; therefore, the pages have NOT necessarily been released for public review in their entirety.

Under the JFK Act, originals to all material deemed assassination records must be accessioned to NARA regardless of whether the material is open in full or released with information postponed. Therefore, any documents or pages from FBI files accessioned to NARA pursuant to the JFK Act are no longer considered the possession of the FBI. The duplicate pages have been inserted strictly for research purposes.

The copies contained herein do not necessarily show the most up-to-date classification.

To attain a copy of the publicly released version of any materials maintained in the JFK Collection at the NARA facility in College Park, MD, you may contact the JFK Access Staff, at 301/713-6620.

The following materials were removed from this file and are maintained in the JFK Collection at NARA:

File & Serial Number

JFK Subject Identifier
(for NARA purposes)

109-12-210-437

MARCOS DIAZ LANZ

For Informational Purposes Only

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
FROM : Legal Attache, Havana (109-12)
SUBJECT:

DATE: February 17, 1959

CUBAN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
FOREIGN MISCELLANEOUS

Enclosed are five copies of a letterhead memorandum on the above-captioned matter.

This information has been made available to the Counselor of Embassy, [redacted] Commercial Attache, American Embassy, Havana.

b7E

Source mentioned herein was [redacted] who is a former source for the Miami Office.

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Information has been classified "~~Confidential~~" inasmuch as it reflects investigation on the part of Legal Attache, Havana.

It is to be noted that ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA is Commander of the Fortress at La Cabana, Havana. He is an Argentine citizen who has expressed anti-American sympathies. CAMILO CIENFUEGOS is the Commander of the Military Camp "Libertad" formerly Camp Columbia, Havana.

2 - Bureau (Enc 5)
1 - Havana
JTH:lg
(3)

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 6855 DML/df
Declassify on: OADR
Date of Declassification Indefinite
12-19-77

11 FEB 25 1959

NAT. INT. SEC.

52 MAR 10 1959

439
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

February 17, 1959

RE: CUBAN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

A source, who has a high level contact at La Cabana Fortress, Havana, Cuba, furnished the following information on February 15, 1959:

ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA is very interested in attempting to convert the salty marshes in Cienega de la Zapata into rice growing plantations. This source stated that GUEVARA reportedly has discussed this problem with FIDEL CASTRO, that CASTRO was in favor of it, and that plans were being made to have some European come to Cuba in order to make a survey of the problem.

According to this source, FIDEL CASTRO is very close to his brother, RAUL, and to ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA. He further pointed out that CAMILO CIENFUEGOS does not enjoy the trust and admiration of FIDEL CASTRO as does GUEVARA.

This source further advised that there was some discussion in which GUEVARA mentioned that the Cuban Government could send a "commercial man" to Russia but definitely had no firm plans with respect to such an appointment at the present time.

This source further stated that the question of an invasion against the Dominican Republic by forces trained in Cuba is being shelved inasmuch as FIDEL CASTRO is now against such a move.

GUEVARA has been convincing FIDEL CASTRO that Cuba should embark on a tremendous plan of public works, education, and social welfare benefits for the humble people. One of the things that he desires is to have commissaries where public workers might buy their foodstuffs wholesale. He has already established such a store at La Cabana.

Discussion also has been had with respect to studying the oil situation in Cuba, and there are plans to bring in technicians to determine just what prospects there are for finding oil in this country. They do not trust some of the oil companies which already have concessions to drill here.

AGENCY

RE

DATE

BY

BY

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ROUTING SLIP

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Date 2/19/59

Memo To **DIRECTOR, FBI - ATTENTION FOREIGN**

SAC Title: **LIAISON**

ASAC

Supervisor

Agent

Steno

Clerk

Chief Clerk

File No.

ACTION DESIRED

Assign to

Acknowledge

Bring File

Call Me

See Me

Correct

Delinquent

Expedite

File

Leads need attention

Undeveloped leads in your district awaiting attention.

Open Case

Prepare assignment cards

Prepare Tickler

Reassign to

Recharge serials

Search and Return

Send serials

to

Submit new charge-out

Submit report by

Type

Return Serials

EMBASSY WEEKA #7 2/17/59

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DATE 4/7/99

BY 60267MS/bue/KOB

xxxxx Legat, Havana

S.A.C.

Office

(In intra office use return this with notation as to action taken or explanation.)

A. H. Belmont

1/26/59

S. B. Donahoe

POTENTIAL POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS IN
LATIN AMERICA AS RESULT OF CUBAN REVOLUTION

As result of successful overthrow of Batista regime in Cuba on 1/1/59, Fidel Castro, Cuban revolutionary leader, has emerged as a self-appointed leader of the masses in Latin America. His obvious fanaticism points strongly to possibility that he may have dreams of leadership in Latin America, along lines of Nasser's recent moves in Middle East, to use the impetus of the Cuban revolution as a motivating force in precipitating agitation in other Latin American countries and thereby welding together a sphere of influence in that area in which he would be the predominating force. This theory is strengthened by Castro's recent visit to Venezuela as part of celebration of first anniversary of successful overthrow of dictatorial regime in that country as well as his reported statement before a press conference 1/22/59, reported in "El Mundo" (a Havana newspaper) that he was an admirer of Albizu Campos (self-styled President of Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico) and favored independence of Puerto Rico.

Trend evidenced here points to possibility that Castro may attempt to act as crusader against dictatorial and military governments in Latin America, using as issues fact that such governments represent "vested interests," suppress civil liberties, use "strong arm" tactics and do not represent "the people." In any such crusade the Castro bloc could be anticipated to include Cuba, Venezuela and possibly Costa Rica aligned against Dominican Republic, Haiti and Nicaragua based on following analysis.

109-NEW

- ① - 109-12-210 (Cuba)
- 1 - 109-12-209 (Costa Rica)
- 1 - 109-12-211 (Dominican Republic)
- 1 - 109-12-214 (British Guiana)
- 1 - 109-12-217 (Haiti)
- 1 - 109-12-222 (Nicaragua)
- 1 - 109-12-228 (Venezuela)

1 - Belmont

2 - Roach

1 - Scatterday

1 - Nasca

1 - Cotter

1 - Little

1 - G. C. Moore

1 - Baumgardner

1 - Bland

1 - W. C. Sullivan

1 - Donahoe

SBD:bbr (20)

4/1/99
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DECLASSIFY ON: 25C

109-12-210
NOT RECORDED
133 FEB 20 1959

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEB 20 1959

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Memorandum for A. H. Belmont
Re: Potential Political Ramifications in
Latin America as Result of Cuban Revolution
109-NEW

The Dominican Republic, where Trujillo is an absolute dictator, is key stronghold of dictatorial rule in Latin America. Trujillo, himself, is a hated and feared man. He rules with an iron fist and exterminates opposition forces ruthlessly.

There are already indications of imminent upheaval in political structure of Haiti where military-type regime exists headed by President Francois Duvalier.

Nicaragua is ruled by Luis Somoza, son of the old-time dictator Anastasio Somoza (who was assassinated) and military influence in the government is predominant.

Aligned against this group with Castro would be Venezuela and possibly Costa Rica. Venezuela had a dictatorial government headed by Colonel Marco Perez Jimenez until he was ousted in January, 1958. A provisional government, combining military and civil elements, ruled until latter part of 1958 when free elections held in which Romulo Betancourt elected President. He is "left of center" in his views and admits to communist connections many years ago. He must walk a tight rope in his policies to keep military group appeased. Costa Rica is headed by President Mario Echandi Jimenez; has democratic form of government and is point where left-wing Venezuelan elements given refuge during dictatorship there. It also served as base for support of Castro revolutionary forces.

While there is no indication as yet that Castro will attempt to pull British Guiana, a British possession, into his orbit its mere existence as neighbor of Venezuela and its political make-up point to fact that it could be slated for possible alliance with Castro. In British Guiana there is an extreme left-wing political party (Peoples Progressive Party) in command headed by Dr. Cheddi Jagan, who is also Prime Minister. His wife, Janet Rosenberg Jagan, has record of former communist affiliations in U.S.

OBSERVATIONS:

In order to get a picture of situation and to determine whether there is a pattern which should be disseminated in government circles, we propose to determine from State [] as well as through research in our own files, identities of opposition groups and individuals that may be expected to agitate

b7E

Memorandum A. H. Belmont
Re: Political Ramifications in
America as Result of Cuban Revolution
109-NE

and provide leadership for any attempt to overthrow existing governments in Dominican Republic, Haiti and Nicaragua. Similarly, information will be sought as to identities of chief political figures in existing governments of Venezuela, Costa Rica and British Guiana. Upon receipt, name check memoranda will be prepared on these individuals in order to get complete picture of data available from other agencies, as well as data developed by Bureau sources, to determine whether picture of communist influence presents pattern warranting dissemination.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. Recommend our liaison representative contact State Department [] to secure on immediate basis identities of groups and individuals, inside and outside countries themselves, likely to provide leadership for any attempt to overthrow governments of Dominican Republic, Haiti and Nicaragua. Similarly, information is desired as to identities of chief political figures in existing governments of Venezuela, Costa Rica and British Guiana. Immediately available material should be secured from State [] by liaison and [] should be requested to furnish additional data as rapidly as possible. Sufficient identifying data is desired with each name to enable proper file review. (S) (U) b7E

2. Upon receipt of names of groups and individuals, Name Check Section will prepare name check memoranda broken down according to data available from other agencies and data available from Bureau sources in order that over-all picture from possible dissemination standpoint can be analysed.

DIRECTOR, FBI (2-1423)

2/6/59

SAC, WFO (97-1017)

**CUBAN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA**

Enclosed herewith are eight copies of the letterhead memorandum captioned "Cuban Political Activities" and dated as above.

WF T-1 is [redacted] WF T-2 is [redacted] for the [redacted] as reflected in letter dated 11/7/58, from the Legat at Havana.

The memorandum was classified "~~Confidential~~" inasmuch as the Legat's letter dated 11/7/58, was so classified and because data reported could reasonably result in the identification of confidential informants of continuing value and compromise the future effectiveness thereof.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 8)
3 - WFO
 (1 - 105-524) (ISRAELI THREATS)
 (1 - 105-26269) [redacted]
MPC:adc
(5)

4/7/99 60267NLS/BCE/KPB

1 ENCLOSURE

53 FEB 21 1959

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ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-524

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington 25, D. C.
February 6, 1958

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 MJS/ACE/ROK
ON 4-7-99

CUBAN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

On February 3, 1958, WF T-1, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that [redacted]

[redacted] who has been in frequent contact with the Israeli Embassy, was in contact with [redacted] at the Israeli Embassy. (U)

The informant advised that [redacted] had indicated he was just getting over the Cuban situation and that he did not get hurt at all. [redacted] further reported that the Ministry (possibly Israeli Defense Ministry) was not involved and Salmon was glad to learn this. [redacted] also said the Cuban situation did not touch Israel but that someone had tried but [redacted] had locked it up in a manner which made everyone happy. [redacted] said even Shimon (possibly Shimon Peres, Israeli Defense Minister), who was very nervous about the situation, is now happy. (S) (U)

In regard to [redacted] on November 7, 1958, WF T-2, a confidential source, advised that the Cuban Government had given a [redacted] letter of credit to [redacted]

The same source reported that [redacted] had requested that the letter of credit be transferred to [redacted] representative of the Government of Israel with offices in New York City, New York. [redacted] was referred to [redacted] Ministry of Defense for the Government of Israel. Under

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

CUBAN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

this arrangement, the Government of Israel was to ship arms valued at two hundred and sixty thousand dollars directly to Cuba. The arms were not described.

On February 3, 1950, WF T-1 learned that Milton Friedman, of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Washington, D. C., had inquired about the voting record of Cuba concerning Israeli issues before the United Nations. WF T-1 advised that Hugh Orgel, Press Attache of the Israeli Embassy, reported that the Embassy had the figures but these were not available at the present time. Friedman reported that he could not recall any anti-Israel feeling on the part of the Cubans. (S) (U)

This memorandum is loaned to you by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and neither it nor its contents are to be distributed outside the agency to which loaned.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Office N

im • UNIT

GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont 1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Estill

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

DATE: February 19, 1959

SUBJECT: POLICE LIAISON - CUBA

CLASSIFIED BY 60207N8180E16B
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 178

Tolson ☒
Belmont ☒
DeLoach ☒
McGuire ☒
Mohr ☒
Parsons ☒
Rosen ☒
Tamm ☒
Trotter ☒
W.C. Sullivan ☒
Tele. Room ☒
Holloman ☒
Gandy ☒

By cable dated 2-12-59 and letter 2-13-59, the Legal Attache, Havana, advised that Antonio De La Carrera, private secretary to President Urrutia of Cuba, had indicated to Embassy officials that Cuban Government might request assistance of FBI in training National Police. Press reports indicated that [redacted] assist in training Cuban rural police but a check with [redacted] revealed no basis for that report. * (S) (U)

Legal Attache advises that the American Embassy through the Point Four Program and the United States Information Service has offered the Cuban Government technical assistance for training in various matters. He believes absolutely no consideration should be given to soliciting a request for Bureau assistance but that consideration should be given only if the request comes from the President of Cuba or his delegated representative. If such a request is received, he suggests temporary assignment of a police training Agent to afford limited training to the National Police in order to build up our police contacts and to prevent some [redacted] for International Cooperation Agency, from providing that assistance to the detriment of our liaison arrangements.

OBSERVATIONS:

De La Carrera is a Cuban attorney who was active in the July 26th Movement in New York prior to departure for Havana 11-8-59 to assume his present position. He has been contacted several times by Agents of the New York Office concerning Cuban revolutionary activities and was cooperative and pro-FBI. The present revolutionary Government of Cuba is politically heterogeneous. It includes anti-United States elements, as well as ones who are favorable toward the United States. Rather than abandon the field, it is believed that the Bureau and the United States should assist those favorable elements where possible in an effort to help them in achieving greater influence in the Cuban Government.

The Bureau police training school in Cuba from 1948 to 1950 was highly successful in building up police relations and contacts. Due to the criticism incurred by the present revolutionary Cuban Government and its political instability, such a school now would be premature. Most of the present Cuban police are young inexperienced men and the police department is disorganized. Although police officials are partisans of Fidel Castro, they have exhibited a very pro-FBI feeling. It is therefore, that if the situation is propitious at the time a request for assistance is received, favorable consideration should be given to the suggestion to send a temporary police instructor to afford limited training to the National Police without setting up a full-fledged school. Such action would help rebuild our police

MLT:ef
(4)
52 MAR 3 1959

Enclosure sent
2-19-59
In answer to Bu cable 2-16-59 Legat advised 2-19-59 that after checking with [redacted] they stated they were affording no training to Cuban Police and there no basis for such

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum Roach to Belmont
RE: POLICE LIAISON - CUBA

contacts and prevent other agencies from taking over police training in Cuba. It should be taken, however, only if and when we receive an unsolicited official request from the Cuban Government.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended the attached cable be sent to the Legal Attache instructing that no request for assistance should be solicited from the Cubans but that if such a request is voluntarily made through official channels by the President of Cuba or his delegated representative, the Bureau would consider temporarily assigning a police instructor to afford limited training to National Police provided the political situation in Cuba is propitious at the time of the request. He is being further advised that if such a request is received, no commitments should be made without Bureau authorization but he should keep the door open for negotiations until a decision can be made by the Bureau.

I concur.

H. J. G.

I am opposed

7/19

L.

~~James~~

~~SECRET~~

DECODED COPY

Tolson ✓
 Belmont ✓
 Mohr ✓
 Nease ✓
 Parsons ✓
 Rosen ✓
 Tamm ✓
 Trotter ✓
 W.C. Sullivan ✓
 Tele. Room ✓
 Holloman ✓
 Gandy ✓
 DeLoach ✓
 Mohr ✓
 W.C. Sullivan ✓

☐ Airgram☒ XX Cablegram

URGENT 2-19-59

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LEGAT, HAVANA NO. 620

AMERICAN GAMBLING ACTIVITIES IN CUBA. ☐ ADVISED THAT BY GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZATION LUXURY CASINOS ARE BEING ALLOWED TO REOPEN. OTHER SOURCES HAVE ADVISED THAT SOME WILL REOPEN TODAY AND OTHERS WILL REQUIRE ADDITIONAL WEEKS PREPARATION. UNDER NEW REGULATIONS BINGO PROHIBITED, OPERATORS MUST HAVE ECONOMIC STANDING AND NO PRISON RECORD, NO ONE UNDER 18 YEARS MAY GAMBLE, CASINOS MUST PRESENT FIRST CLASS SHOWS AND ADVERTISING MENTIONING SPECIFIC GAMES AVAILABLE NOT PERMITTED. REGULATIONS WILL BE SET LATER CONCERNING SLOT MACHINES. AMOUNT OF GOVERNMENT TAX ON CASINOS NOT YET FIXED.

JAMES T. HAVERTY

RECEIVED: 2-19-59 3:32 PM HJT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 4/1/99 BY 60267 NLS/DOE/KOB

2 CC TO MM & NY
 BY 0-7 FOR INFO
 2-26-59 AAS/jtc

53 MAR 5 1959

REC-65

107-12-210-445
FEB 27 1959

NAT. INT. SEC.

cc: Mr. Rosen
 Mr. Rosen

DECODED COPY

To: _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Nease _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

☐ Airgram☒ Cablegram

W.C. Sullivan
 W.C. Sullivan

URGENT 2-22-59

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LEGAT, HAVANA CUBA NO. 624

CUBAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY, FOREIGN POLITICAL-CUBA. RE HAVANA
 CABLE FEBRUARY 12 LAST CAPTIONED BURO REVOLUCIONARIO DE
 INVESTIGACIONES INTERNACIONALES (BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
 INVESTIGATIONS). CAMILO CIENFUEGOS, (BUFILE 105-54536) LEFT
 WITH 8 OF HIS FOLLOWERS 8:00 AM THIS DATE FOR NEW YORK CITY
 FOR SEVERAL DAYS VISIT WHERE THEY WILL BE GUESTS OF MAYOR OF
 CITY. SOURCE OF INFORMATION IS VISA SECTION, AMERICAN EMBASSY,
 HAVANA.

JAMES T. HAVERTY

RECEIVED:

2-22-59

9:59 PM CTF

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 4-7-99 BY 60807 NW/BCE/PK

REC-70

FEB 26 1959

MAR 4 1959

107-12-210

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (109-124)

FROM : Legal Attache, Havana (109-124)

DATE: March 3, 1959

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

ReBulet January 29, 1959.

Due to the fact that stenographic help in this office are presently compiling various quarterly and monthly reports, report on above-captioned subject matter will not submitted until March 10.

2 - Bureau
1 - Havana
lg

4/2/99

60267NLS/BOE/103

REC-33

447

1 - Original	1 - Mr. Staffeld
1 - Mr. Belmont	1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Rosen	1 - Yellow
1 - Mr. DeLoach	3-4-59

CODE

CABLEGRAM

URGENT

TO LEGAL ATTACHE HAVANA
FROM DIRECTOR FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/7/99 BY 60271 NS/BCE/873

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTER, IS DASH CUBA. REURCABLE MARCH FOUR, LAST. WESSELS STATEMENTS TO HAVE CUBAN PRINCIPALS MAKE DIRECT APPROACH TO LEGAL ATTACHE ARE COMPLETELY UNAUTHORIZED. YOU ARE TO MAKE NO MOVE UNTIL OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IS MADE THROUGH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA BY CASTRO'S FORCES. KEEP ME FULLY INFORMED ON ALL DEVELOPMENTS.

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (detached)

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Copy : of Director's memorandum 3-4-59 to Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Rosen, and DeLoach and copy of Havana cablegram attached.

*Return to
Tolson
WFE*

950
10014-24

REC-33

107-12354-448

2 MAR 6 1959

son _____
mont _____
Loach _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Sent via cable 3/4/59 9 p

Date: February 16, 1959

30985

To: Director, FBI

From: Legal Attache, Havana (66-101)

Subject: INTELLIGENCE SURVEY - CUBA

SYNOPSIS

CONFUSION IN GOVERNMENT (page 1): Complete turnover of almost all officials and subordinates in government since January 1. Up until February 13 CASTRO formulating policy without consulting with Cabinet. This led to resignation of Prime Minister MIRO CARDONA. Most government officials lack administrative ability and are considered immature. ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING (page 4): CASTRO by anti-American remarks has helped inflame anti-American feeling which previously did not exist in Cuba. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS (page 4): Approximately 500,000 unemployed due to ouster of government workers; strikes; hesitancy on part of business interests to commence new projects. CASTRO has had good success in appealing to workers to stop strikes. REMOVAL OF UNITED STATES MILITARY MISSIONS (page 5): United States Military Missions under attack by CASTRO being recalled. CASTRO claims going to have Venezuelans [redacted] train army forces. STUDENTS TAKE OVER HAVANA UNIVERSITY (page 7): Federation of University Students in complete control Havana University. Wants to dictate not only who should teach students but also subjects to be taught. CENSORSHIP (page 8): Telephone communications being monitored. CASTRO calls for boycott of periodicals which he considers attack revolution. EXECUTIONS OF "WAR CRIMINALS" (page 9): Approximately 325 now executed but executions still continuing. First major trial was sort of sports' affair with 17,000 personally witnessing it at Sports' Palace, Havana. COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES (page 11): Communist Party in open and operating own newspaper "Hoy." Attempts to identify itself with revolution. ASYLUM PROBLEM (page 15): Cuban Government wants right to say who should be given asylum. CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES (page 17): Gambling casinos in important hotels expected to open in next few days.

REC-95

7- Bureau
1- Havana
TH/DJB:lg
8

MAR 12 1959

b7D



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

February 16, 1959

RE: INTELLIGENCE SURVEY - CUBA

CONFUSION IN GOVERNMENT

4/7/99
The first six weeks of the new Cuban Revolutionary Government has shown the weaknesses of various government leaders and their total dependence for guidance on the words of FIDEL CASTRO, the "maximo lider" (greatest leader) of the revolution. The Provisional President, MANUEL URRUTIA LLEO, has proven to be a mere figurehead and one whose policies sway with the words of CASTRO. The strong man in the Government, namely Prime Minister JOSE MIRO CARDONA, made two unsuccessful efforts to resign, and finally on February 13, 1959, his resignation was accepted. This resignation was brought about by the fact that government policy was difficult to formulate while FIDEL CASTRO had a free reign in making extemporaneous decisions without consulting with other Government leaders. The fact that FIDEL CASTRO has now accepted the position of Prime Minister definitely will place more responsibility upon his shoulders to think through a problem before making a snap solution.

The actual functioning of Government affairs was hampered by the almost 100 per cent turnover, not only on the part of highly placed Government officials but also on the part of the low-salaried Government employees. This resultant

Re: Intelligence Survey - Cuba

2/16/59

take-over of Government functions by absolutely unequipped individuals has caused almost complete chaos in the day-to-day functionings of the Government. It has also caused much hard feeling on the part of old-time Government employees who were dismissed from their positions merely because they had served during the Batista regime, even though they had never been sympathetic to the policies of the former Cuban leader, General FULGENCIO BATISTA.

Over the week-end of February 7, 1959, the Cabinet approved the "Ley Fundamental" (Basic Law) which is to govern its actions until a Constitutional Government is re-established under the Constitution of 1940 or under some new constitution which might be brought up. Under this "Basic Law" the right of writ of habaes corpus is not permitted to those persons accused of "war crimes" under the BATISTA regime. It also reduced to 30 the age for President and Cabinet members, thus making FIDEL CASTRO eligible. Citizenship is conferred on foreigners who served as officers in the Rebel Army, and it contained a special provision which granted native-born citizenship to anyone who had served as an officer with the Rebel Forces for more than two years. This latter provision was tailor-made for only one individual, namely the Argentine National, ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA.

The revolution has brought into the Government a group of young, immature individuals lacking in any previous administrative experience. In many instances persons are designated for

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2/16/59

high positions on the strength of the fact that they were individuals who accompanied FIDEL CASTRO to Cuba from Mexico on the "Gramma." The Chief of the National Police is a man of no educational qualifications and who by occupation is a taxi-cab driver. His claim to fame is that he lost three brothers in the revolution, and he is one of the original survivors of the "Gramma" expedition. Most members of the Cabinet, although considered to be honest and hard workers, are not known for their previous business or administrative experience. Prior to his accepting the position of Prime Minister, on many occasions in public utterances CASTRO would expound at great length on the Government's policies and then in the same speech would disclaim any responsibilities for mistakes made by public leaders by stating he had not appointed them and what policy such leaders formulated was their own. There is no doubt that there is honesty among the officials in the present Cuban Government. CASTRO has stated he wished Ministers' salaries to be cut in half and indicated that they henceforth would receive \$425.00 per month with nothing being given them for expenses. If this plan is carried through, there is no doubt that some Ministers will resign inasmuch as they could not possibly live on such a low standard of living. (No dissemination - Public knowledge. Opinion of Legat.)

2/16/59

ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING

FIDEL CASTRO, although stating that he is not anti-American in his sentiments, has in public remarks flamed anti-American feeling which previously did not exist in Cuba. His intemperate attacks on United States big business and United States foreign policy have been echoed by other members of his coterie. FIDEL CASTRO has some of the makings of a demagogue. In his speeches he has attacked American news agencies, American big business, American Ambassadors, and American Military Missions.

(No dissemination - Public knowledge.)

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

It is estimated that at the present time there are approximately 500,000 unemployed in Cuba. Although in the first month of the revolution there were numerous strikes on the part of labor, CASTRO and the Government leaders have pointed out that, although they realize that in most instances the workers had just grievances, workers should defer their demands until such time as the sugar crop has been harvested. It is to be noted that this crop is usually harvested between December 15 and April 15, at which latter date the rains usually commence in Cuba and prevent further work in the cane fields. CASTRO has had good success in convincing the workers that they should return to their jobs, but in public speeches he has pointed out to them that the Government in the future will see to it that their demands are met.

Re: Intelligence Survey - Cuba

2/16/59

CASTRO has stated that agrarian reform is the cornerstone of his economic program. In this respect he stated that in order to combat unemployment, greater job opportunities must be created; that to create greater job opportunities new industries were needed which would be protected by stringent tariffs. Under the agrarian reform the rural population would have more funds with which to purchase products from these new industries. CASTRO, himself, during the first part of February made a trip to the Eastern part of Cuba where he distributed some lands to the peasants.

Factors which tend to create the present poor economic conditions are an unstable labor market with wildcat strikes; the lack of tourism; the freezing of a number of bank accounts and safe deposit boxes; and the hesitancy on the part of business to engage in new enterprises under an unstable government.

(No dissemination - Public knowledge.)

REMOVAL OF UNITED STATES MILITARY MISSIONS

CASTRO on numerous occasions has stated that United States Military Missions must be removed from Cuba. He derides these missions by claiming that they had trained the defeated Batista forces. CASTRO wished to convey the impression that his military genius had defeated a much larger army and, furthermore,

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2/16/59

an army that had been trained by U. S. military men. Most informed people realize that the defeat of the Batista forces was brought about by corruption on the part of the high Cuban military leaders and poor morale on the part of the average foot soldier. No specific request was made by Cuban officials for the withdrawal of U. S. Military Missions; however, when United States authorities stated that consideration would be given to the withdrawal of such groups, the Cuban Government stated that it would agree to such withdrawal.

Articles have appeared in the public press which state that the Cuban Army will be reorganized in the outlying regions into a rural guard and that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] will instruct this new group. This has been denied by [REDACTED]

(S) (U)

CASTRO has also mentioned that he had plans to have his Army trained by a military mission from Venezuela. He either forgets or does not know that the Venezuelan Army is being trained by one of the largest U. S. Missions in Latin America.

The old Army of Cuba is completely disorganized, and it has been reported that CASTRO will not permit one official of the old Army to be retained in his position.

RAUL CASTRO is presently in Havana and is taking a hand in the reorganization of the new Cuban Army.

(No dissemination - Public knowledge.)

2/16/59

STUDENTS TAKE OVER HAVANA UNIVERSITY

During the week of February 3, 1959, the Federation of University Students (FEU) took over the premises of Havana University and ousted the University Council which ruled this institution. The FEU stated that the University Council had not acted rapidly enough in dismissing former faculty members who had close association with the Batista regime and also that such council had not corrected the deficiencies in the university's curricula. As in most Latin American countries, the university students are a strong political force. At Havana University they have always been a source of trouble. FIDEL CASTRO, himself, while a student at Havana University, was considered to be one of the "gangster elements" which terrorized not only the student body but the faculty members. It is known that in the past students have secured degrees from this University by threatening at gunpoint the professors. It is also known that professors have received emoluments for years even though they taught no classes.

The FEU at the present time wants complete voice, not only in the selection of professors but also what subjects will be taught.

A serious bone of contention has arisen with respect to private universities by the application of "Law 11" which abrogates all degrees conferred by these universities during

Re: Intelligence Survey - Cuba

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the past two years. The claim is made by the revolutionary government that this is necessary so as not to penalize the students who were fighting with the revolutionary forces during the time that private universities were conferring degrees. The largest of the private universities is that of the American-owned "Villanueva" located in Havana. This university is now closed. Authorities in charge of Villanueva University state that they will not reopen the university until "Law 11" is repealed and also will not tolerate the control of their university by members of the FEU.

The Minister of Education, a young, 28-year-old revolutionary with no previous administrative experience, has been openly backing the FEU in its claims.

(No dissemination - Public knowledge and opinion of Legat.)

CENSORSHIP

As pointed out above, the writ of habeas corpus for "war criminals" has been suspended. It has also been reliably ascertained that international telephone calls and some local telephone calls are being monitored by Government authorities. CASTRO in numerous public statements has attacked the "monopolistic" North American press services, claiming they have not given a true picture of the Cuban revolutionary scene. He

Re: Intelligence Survey - Cuba

2/16/59

has stated he would like to see Latin American nations form a new Latin American press service. CASTRO has proven himself to be very "thin skinned" with respect to any public criticism. The prominent Cuban magazine "Zig Zag", which is noted for its sharp cartoons, bore the brunt of a verbal attack by CASTRO because of several cartoons appearing in the magazine which CASTRO considered to be anti-revolutionary. CASTRO publicly called for a boycott against any periodicals which he considered were attacking the revolution.

(No dissemination - Public knowledge.)

EXECUTIONS OF "WAR CRIMINALS"

To date approximately 325 former followers of the Batista regime have been executed before firing squads throughout Cuba. World press reaction to wholesale executions by present Cuban officials caused CASTRO to invite to Cuba approximately 300 foreign newspapermen in what he called "Operation Truth." In connection with this operation, on January 21, 1959, he delivered a speech in the Central Park of Havana, at which gathering Government officials claimed one million persons were in attendance. In his talk CASTRO called on the people for public support for the execution of Batista "war criminals." The following day, January 22, 1959, the Government staged what was billed a model public trial of one of these "war criminals", which trial was to demonstrate to the world the fairness of the court martial proceedings. The accused was one of the Batista Army commanders

Re: Intelligence Survey - Cuba

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with the worst of reputations, namely Major JESUS SOSA BLANCO. The proceedings were televized and were personally witnessed by 17,000 persons. The scene was the Havana Sports Palace, and, instead of a murder trial, it had all the earmarks of a sporting event. The hooting, howling mob cheered on the prosecution and booed the defense. SOSA BLANCO in defense stated that this was not a trial but merely a spectacle like that which was held in the Coliseum of Rome. He was found guilty and ordered to be shot; however, his case was appealed, and, evidently because of the world-wide press attacks on the type of trial he received, a new trial for him has been ordered. It is Legal Attache's opinion he will be shot.

In the Havana area, ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA is the one conducting the trials of the Batista sympathizers. With methodical frequency his court martial hearings result in a sentence of death for the accused.

CASTRO has consistently alleged that such executions are necessary and has stated that the Government will have terminated with them by March of 1959. In many instances those being tried for "war crimes" were officers of the Batista forces who claimed that they killed rebels merely in Army battles. The courts do not listen with much sympathy to the plea that such officers were mainly carrying out their duties. At the present time approximately 20 Cuban aviators of the Batista Army are

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being tried in Oriente Province for having carried out the orders of their commanding officers to bomb Cuban towns.

There is no voice raised among the revolutionary leaders to condemn those of their members who committed acts of terrorism against the Batista Government. Those rebel sympathizers who threw bombs into stores in Havana during the revolutionary days whereby women were killed and maimed are now considered to be the heroes of the revolution.

Information has been received that one of the individuals who was instrumental in stealing a Miami-to-Cuba bound Cuban Airlines Viscount may now hold an important Government position. In the stealing of this plane, which crashed in Oriente Province on attempting to land, several American citizens were killed. Because of the violent reaction of the press at that time to this haphazard endangering of civilian life, the rebel leaders stated that such attempted theft was done without their sanction and that those involved in it would be punished; however, no such action is known to have been taken.

(No dissemination - Public knowledge and opinion of Legat.)

COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES

The Partido Socialista Popular (PSP - Cuban Communist Party) daily newspaper "Hoy", which has appeared daily since January 5, 1959, continues to espouse the line of continued

2/16/59

close cooperation between the revolutionary forces with full participation in the new government for all elements which participated in the liberation. The PSP claims such participation. It attempts to closely align the Communists and their program with the Castro Government. Of course, it violently attacks the United States as being "imperialistic" and is highly laudatory of Soviet achievements.

The PSP has openly established its Cuban National Headquarters at Calle Prado 426 in Havana and is reportedly in the process of opening Provincial and Sectional Offices throughout the country.

During the first month of the revolution there were very few public attacks on the part of newspapers or Government officials against the PSP; in fact, to the contrary, July 26 leaders, such as ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA and CAMILO CIENFUEGOS openly stated that they saw nothing wrong with having a legally constituted Communist Party.

Beginning with about February 1, 1959, however, some Havana newspapers have begun to attack Communism. The leading Cuban weekly magazine "Bohemia" carried a six-page article which claimed that Communism in Cuba was merely trying to disrupt normal Cuban-United States relationships. This article pointed out the threat to Cuba of the world-wide conspiracy which was Communism.

Re: Intelligence Survey - Cuba

2/16/59

Other newspapers also have attacked openly the PSP and its leaders, claiming that they took orders from Moscow.

Although in the first few days of the revolution the files of the Bureau for Repression of Communist Activity (BRAC) were confiscated and placed in the hands of ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA, information has been received by this office that rebel leaders, including FIDEL CASTRO, now are fearful of the Communist threat and are desirous of forming a highly secret Government organization which would be one to investigate Communism and be vigilant concerning its endeavors.

[REDACTED] (U) and public source. Disseminated locally and Bureau advised.)

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The Cuban Secretary of State, ROBERTO AGRAMONTE, publicly stated on January 25, 1959, that the Cuban Revolutionary Government did not contemplate establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The former Prime Minister, JOSE MIRO CARDONA, however, on February 4, 1959, stated that the Cuban Government was not "anti-anything or anti-any nation" and pointed out that if the United States maintained diplomatic relations with Communist-bloc countries, there is no reason that Cuba should not do likewise.

Information was received by this office that VASIL CHICHKOV, a representative of the Russian newspaper "Pravda" had come to Havana from Mexico on January 21, 1959. He was

Re: Intelligence Survey - Cuba

2/16/59

accompanied by JUAN MANUEL BERLANGA, a representative of the Mexico City newspaper "El Popular." Source advised that transportation for these two had been paid by the Cuban Government, which also paid for approximately 300 newspapermen who came to Cuba at that time. Their hotel bill, however, was paid by ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA.

(Source -

Disseminated locally and to Bureau by letter February 9, 1959, titled CURRENT SOVIET ESPIONAGE AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES.)

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b7C
b7D

SEVERO AGUIRRE, a representative of the PSP to the 21st Communist Party Congress in Moscow, according to public sources, claimed that the PSP of Cuba "working underground at the price of the lives of many of its leaders, actually launched the struggle for unification of all Cuban revolutionary forces."

On February 7, 1959, newspapers in Havana alleged that JUAN MARINELLO, President of the PSP, was going to Moscow to "receive instructions." In a public letter he stated he intended to make a trip to Moscow in connection with the World Peace Council.

Two sources have advised that RAUL CASTRO has mentioned that he had fears that the Communists might become too strong, especially in the labor field. Another source has advised that

Re: Intelligence Survey - Cuba

2/16/59

CAMILO CIENFUEGOS, one of the July 26 Commanders, is attempting to set up a secret government organization to investigate Communism.

(Sources - Former [redacted]
and [redacted] Disseminated locally
and last part to Bureau by cable.)

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ASYLUM PROBLEM

Some diplomatic establishments in Cuba have been irritated over the attitude of the Cuban Government with respect to the asylum problem. The Cuban Secretary of State alleged that many individuals who had been given asylum by foreign embassies were nothing more than criminals. The diplomatic establishments themselves stated that they were the only ones who could judge to whom they furnished asylum. The problem was further heightened when, on two occasions, planes which were taking asylees out of the country found it necessary to return to Cuba, presumably suffering from mechanical trouble. On one of these occasions the Cuban Government stated that those returning were no longer eligible to receive asylum. After strong protest on the part of the diplomatic embassy involved (Chile), these individuals again were permitted to enter the Embassy. They are still there. It has been rumored that the malfunctioning of the airplanes was merely a ruse whereby Cuban Government authorities hoped to be able to get their hands on some of those seeking asylum. The

Re: Intelligence Survey - Cuba

2/16/59

irritation of the Cuban Diplomatic Corps reached such a degree that an official Cuban reception in honor of the Cuban hero "Jose Marti" was boycotted by the foreign embassy establishments.

(No dissemination - Public knowledge.)

2/16/59

CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

1. Top Hoodlums

Only two top hoodlums are definitely known to be in Havana area at the present time. They are SANTO TRAFFICANTE and JACK LANSKY, both Miami Top Hoodlums. Sources have indicated that additional top hoodlums probably would appear on the Cuban scene in the near future if the gambling casinos are reopened.

2. Gambling

FIDEL CASTRO has publicly stated that the gambling casinos will be reopened. Local American gamblers have indicated that they hoped to have the casinos opened by February 21, 1959. Because tourism is at almost a standstill, many casino operators have indicated they would prefer to keep the casinos closed because they feel they would lose less money.

In this connection, sources have indicated that it was former Prime Minister JOSE MIRO CARDONA's strong stand against reopening gambling casinos which caused him to submit his resignation. In early speeches FIDEL CASTRO had, to a certain extent, committed the new Cuban Government to reopening the casinos on a controlled and limited basis. Subsequent demonstrations by employees of the gambling casinos apparently gave the necessary impetus to the move to get the casinos

2/16/59

reopened. It is expected that the gambling casinos in the Sans Souci and Tropicana night clubs, as well as in the Hotels Riviera, Hilton, Nacional, and Capri will reopen. Also, there have been indications that the casinos in the Hotels Comodoro and Plaza possibly may reopen. The reopening of gambling casinos will be done on a trial basis, and there are definite indications that the Cuban Government contemplates "taking over" these casinos after a period of a few months. American gamblers in Havana recognize that this may happen but are confident that Cuban operated and managed gambling casinos will not be successful and will not attract tourists.

3. "Take"

No definite pronouncement as yet has been made by the Cuban Government as to the percentage of profit the Government desires to receive from gambling operations. As previously reported, FIDEL CASTRO on one occasion stated that the casino profits would be divided as follows:

40 per cent - Cuban charity;
30 " " - tourist promotion;
30 " " - casino operators.

One source has indicated that this statement by CASTRO concerned itself with the gross take of the casino rather than with the net profit and pointed out that no casino could operate on 30 per cent of the gross take for the casino operator.

2/16/59

4. Police Tie-Ups With Organized Crime

As yet, there has been no indication of any police tie-ups with organized crime. There is, of course, as yet a substantial lack of organization on the part of the various Cuban law enforcement agencies, as well as a lack of clarity as to just what jurisdiction these agencies have. In addition, there has been no indication as to what particular police agency might have contact with or jurisdiction of gambling casinos.

5. Other Criminal Activity

No new developments.

DECODED COPY

Tolson ☒
 Belmont ☒
 Mohr ☒
 Nease ☒
 Parsons ☒
 Rosen ☒
 Tamm ☒
 Trotter ☒
 W.C. Sullivan ☒
 Tele. Room ☒
 Holloman ☒
 Gandy ☒

FOI/PA # 245,379

APPROVAL

C **Airgram**

E.O. 12351

DATE 11385

INITIALS oms

DECLASSIFIED BY per State Ltr 7/16/86

SPSci/oms

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XX

Cablegram

DECLASSIFIED ON

BY per State Ltr 7/16/86

SPSci/oms

DeLoach ☒
 McGuire ☒
 W.C. Sullivan ☒

URGENT

3-4-59

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LEGAT, HAVANA

NO. 629

11385
 91451 oms
 Decl. on: OADR 245379

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTER, IS - CUBA. [REBUCAB FEBRUARY 3 LAST. EMBASSY RECEIVED FOLLOWING CONFIDENTIAL TELEGRAM FROM STATE DEPARTMENT MARCH 3 WHICH WAS MADE KNOWN TO THIS OFFICE TODAY. QUOTE FOR LEGAL ATTACHE FROM LEGAL ADVISER. THE DEPARTMENT WAS APPROACHED BY MILTON WESSEL, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR COORDINATION JUSTICE ACTIVITIES RELATING TO ORGANIZED CRIME, WESSEL IN TURN HAD BEEN APPROACHED BY [REDACTED] MIAMI ATTORNEY, REPORTED TO REPRESENT FERNANDEZ, HEAD OF SUGAR STABILIZATION INSTITUTE, JOSE LLANUZA (REFERRED TO AS MAYOR OF HABANA), AND MRS. NUNEZ, UNDERSTOOD TO BE GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL IN CHARGE OF SUPERVISION OF GAMBLING. BOTH STATED CUBA WANTED TO REOPEN GAMBLING CASINOS BUT WANTED TO BE ASSURED SPONSORS LEGITIMATE AND REQUESTED INFORMATION ON AMERICANS ENGAGED IN SUCH ACTIVITIES. [REDACTED] OFFERED IN TURN INFORMATION OF INTEREST TO WESSEL OFFICE, IMMIGRATION, ETC. IN DEPARTMENT'S VIEW UNDESIRABLE INITIATE SUCH EXCHANGE THROUGH U. S. INTERMEDIARY SUCH AS [REDACTED] ACCORDINGLY, HAVE INFORMED WESSEL TO TELL [REDACTED] TO HAVE CUBAN PRINCIPALS MAKE DIRECT APPROACH LEGAL ATTACHE, U. S. EMBASSY, HABANA. WESSEL MAIN OFFICE IS ROOM 607, U. S. COURT HOUSE, FOLEY SQUARE NEW YORK CITY. HERTER. UNQUOTE THIS OFFICE HAS RECEIVED NO

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 03-10-59 BY SP-10-59

EX-132

DEC-53

109-12-210-452

10 MAR 9 1959

cc. Mr. Belmont
 cc. Mr. Roach

MAR 13 1959

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

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☐ Airgram~~CONFIDENTIAL~~☒ XX

Cablegram

PAGE TWO FROM HAVANA NO. 629

REQUEST FROM OFFICIALS HERE FOR INFORMATION ON AMERICANS
 OPERATING GAMBLING ESTABLISHMENTS. JOSE LLANUZA IS MAYOR
 OF HAVANA. PASTORITA NUNEZ IS MINISTER OF SOCIAL WELFARE
 AND SUPERVISES CASINOS. ALBERTO FERNANDEZ IS HEAD SUGAR
 INSTITUTE. BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED IMMEDIATELY ON RECEIPT
 OF FUTURE INFORMATION.

Not class. Eval per
 State Letter 7/16/86
 SP5CLAN

JAMES T. HAVERTY

RECEIVED:

4-4-59

11:46 AM

MJC-MAP

Memo to
 AG 3/5/59
 C. L. G. i. p. d. n.
 Swale

This is outrageous
 presumption upon
 Wessell's part. Send
 memo to A.G.; Walsh
 & Anderson pointing
 out we have long had an
 established office in Cuba
 & such matters as this
 should be taken up thru
 channels particularly in
 view of critical diplomatic
 situation. I have orally
 alerted Anderson.

3-12-59

Airtel

To: SAC, New York
2 - Miami

From: Director, FBI (109-12-210)
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA
IS - CUBA

Reurairtels 3-5-59 with enclosures captioned "Cuban Revolutionary Activities." Enclosures contain data indicating Castro Government to be overthrown by end March; testimonial dinner being planned for Antonio Varona to coincide with overthrow Castro; and, that Faure Jomon of Directorio Revolucionario planning coup against Castro Government. New York and Miami immediately canvass sources and informants for any confirmation this data and all information concerning testimonial being planned for Varona. Keep Bureau advised.

1 - Havana

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit

VHN:jlc
(8)

REC-92



83 MAR 18 1959

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cont _____
by _____
no _____
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MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

453

Date: 109-12-210-
March 11, 1959

To: Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: JOSEPH NORTH
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/7/99 BY 60267N8/BOE/183

Reference is made to previous communications concerning captioned individual.

Information has been received that North, since his return from Cuba, has been making speeches regarding the Cuban situation in the New York City area and that he contemplates additional speeches on the same subject throughout the United States.

According to one source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, North, in a speech delivered on February 15, 1959, in New York City, stated he had addressed large groups on the "island" and that these groups had a common contempt and even hatred for the United States Government, particularly the United States Department of State and the FBI, and a respect and even love for the American people. North accused the United States Government of having supported Batista with arms, planes and bombs and of having trained Batista's pilots. North added that he had seen planes that had been bombed that the United States had been a villain for political reasons. North said that he had seen the United States Ambassador for Batista and that he had seen these officers.

As above is submitted for your information.

89 MAR 24 1959

SEE NOTE ON YELLOW, PAGE 2

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-61835

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Subject in Security Index and key figure of New York Office. He has served in editorial capacity for communist publications for many years and has given numerous speeches for communist causes for many years. He recently traveled to Cuba as a correspondent for "The Worker." Since his return he has written articles regarding the Cuban situation for "The Worker" and has been giving public speeches under communist auspices on the same subject.

3/2/59

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-61835)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-13444)

SUBJECT: JOSEPH NORTH
IS-C

Re NY airtel to Bureau dated 2/26/59, and NY Letter
letter to Bureau dated 2/27/59.

Enclosed are 5 copies of a letterhead memorandum
for appropriate dissemination.

The sources referred to in the letterhead memorandum
in order of appearance are Panel Sources [redacted]
and [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

4/7/99

100-61835/BCE/KOB

3-Bureau (100-61835) (RM)

3-New York (100-13444)

(1- [redacted] Investigative)
(1- [redacted] Investigative)

b7D

CMH:jvm
(6)

/ 100-61835



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
New York, New York
March 2, 1959

NY 100-13444

Re: Joseph North
Internal Security - C

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, attended a meeting entitled, "Eye-Witness Report on the Cuban Revolution" which was delivered by Joseph North, Foreign Editor of "The Worker", Sunday evening, February 15, 1959, at Brighton Beach Community Center, 3200 Coney Island Avenue, Brooklyn, New York.

"The Worker" is an East Coast Communist weekly newspaper.

Source advised, among other things, that North stated that he had addressed large groups from one end of the island to the other. The groups had had one thing in common, a contempt, even hatred, for the United States Government, particularly for the State Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a respect, even love for the American people as represented by the group at this meeting. The American Government had supplied Batista with arms, planes and bombs, and has trained the Batista pilots. He had seen many villages that had been bombed. The Isle of Pines had been a prison for Political Prisoners and had been the scene of tortures. Ambassador Smith must have been aware of these tortures as Federal Bureau of Investigation men had been assigned to the Island. In the Batista files, five identification cards of Federal Bureau of Investigation men had been found. It was their job to put the finger on Castro supporters.

Another source, who has furnished reliable information in the past and who attended the above-mentioned meeting, advised on February 24, 1959, that North stated

4/8/99 60267NLS/BCE/HBY

100-13444-
ENCLOSURE

PROPERTY OF THE FBI
This report is loaned to
you by the FBI and must
be returned to the
agency to which loaned.

in his talk that he arrived in Havana, Cuba, on the same day that Fidel Castro arrived there.

Source advised that North stated that Batista cooperated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and that the FBI sent five FBI Agents incognito to Cuba during the revolution. North further stated that these five FBI Agents took positions with the Batista Secret Police with the idea of keeping an eye on Americans who came to Cuba during the Revolution.

Source also advised that subject also stated in passing that the Batista Secret Police are even worse than the FBI.

Mr. Rosen
Mr. Nasca

Legal Attache, Havana

March 9, 1959

Director, FBI

AMERICAN GAMBLING ACTIVITIES IN HAVANA, CUBA

Reurcable 3/4/59 captioned "Foreign Political Matter, IS - Cuba,"

Information concerning American gambling activities in Cuba should be submitted in the future under the caption of this communication.

VIN:slm

(7)

1 - 109-12-210 (Foreign Political Matters - Cuba)

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route thru for review)

4/8/99

6/20/92/BC/RSB

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MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

109-12-210 -
MAR 12 1959

3/13/59

CODE

CABLEGRAM

DEFERRED

30986

TO LEGAT, HAVANA
FROM DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)

4/8/99

60267MS/BCE/KB

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA, IS - CUBA. ALLEGATION RECEIVED
CASTRO GOVERNMENT WILL BE OVERTHROWN BY END MARCH. ANTONIO VARONA
AUTHENTIC ORGANIZATION WILL BE COALITION GOVERNMENT CHOICE FOR
PRESIDENCY. TESTIMONIAL DINNER PLANNED FOR VARONA NEW YORK TO
COINCIDE WITH OVERTHROW CASTRO GOVERNMENT. FAURE CHOMON OF
DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ALLEGEDLY PLANNING OVERTHROW CASTRO
REGIME. SUCABLE ANY CONFIRMATION. IMMEDIATELY SUREP ANY INFORMATION
INDICATING EXTENT OPPOSITION TO CASTRO, IDENTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL
GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS, EXTENT COMMUNIST INFLUENCE AMONG OPPOSITION
GROUPS AND ESTIMATE THEIR CAPACITY TO INITIATE ACTION WHICH MIGHT
OVERTHROW CASTRO GOVERNMENT. 952

VEN: jlc: gds

(4)

REC-46

20 MAR 16 1959

ENC. 1432-1439 BY 14

CK. 1443-1505 BY 14

APPROVED BY 14

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (route through for review) TYPED BY

NOTE: Cable being sent in view of Cuban situation. It should be sent
via State Dept. facilities at no cost to Bu. Cable must be in code room
5 p.m. daily, if State Dept. facilities are to be used. If cable
rives too late to be sent by State Dept. facilities, it should be held
until the next morning.

57 MAR 18 1959

Code Room

MAIL ROOM ☐TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SENT VIA CABLE 3/13/59 10:49 AM di

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/8/99 BY 60267 NUS/RE/1083

137

REC- 53

NOT RECORDED

20 MAR 18 1959

NAT. INT. SEC.

50 MAR 24 1959

57 PM '59

24 February 1959

From: Chairman, Inter-American Defense Board
To: Director, Naval Intelligence

Subj: Report of a briefing presented by Miss Dickey Chapelle (Overseas News correspondent) relative to her observations while covering the Castro Forces in Cuba during the period 27 November to 23 December 1958

1. On 12 February 1959, Miss Dickey Chapelle, an Overseas News correspondent whom I had met during World War II, gave a briefing to the U. S. officers assigned to the Staff of the Inter-American Defense Board on her observations and comments on the operations of the Castro Forces during the period 27 November to 23 December 1958, while she was in Cuba on an assignment for the Reader's Digest.

2. In view of the dearth of first hand information published on the composition and operational methods of the Castro Forces, a report of this interview is submitted as a matter of interest and assistance in predicting the pattern Castro's supporters may follow in their avowed campaign against the so called "dictators" in Latin America.

3. The briefing was presented generally in three parts. Initially, Miss Chapelle presented her observations relative to the composition of the Rebel Forces, their motivation, their operational methods or tactics, and the attitude of the residents of Oriente Province. Secondly, Miss Chapelle showed and commented on approximately seventy-five (75) black and white photographs and 35 millimeter color slides that she had taken during her period with the Castro Forces. As the final portion of the briefing, Miss Chapelle answered questions posed by the officers present.

4. The following is a resume of Miss Chapelle's briefing:

At the outset Miss Chapelle stated that she was in Cuba on a straight assignment for the magazine publication "Reader's Digest" to obtain the answers to the three following questions:

(1) Were United States manufactured aircraft strafing undefended Cuban communities

(2) Were these aircraft dropping bombs?

(3) Were these aircraft using napalm

Miss Chapelle stated that the answers to all three questions were in the affirmative.

Miss Chapelle stated that she had left Havana and entered "Free Cuba", the area controlled by Castro, on 27 November. During the course of the conversation it was brought out that Miss Chapelle had gotten through the Batista lines by pretending to be the wife of a U. S. Marine officer stationed at Guantanamo and that she was attempting to avoid the authorities in order to see her husband. She showed a Batista officer a "phony" picture of a Marine officer and was permitted to pass without further identity check. Miss Chapelle came out of "Free Cuba" on 23 December 1958.

During the period Miss Chapelle was in "Free Cuba", Castro's Forces were divided into two groups. Raul Castro, with the smaller of the two groups, had his headquarters located NORTH of the Central Highway. Fidel Castro, with the larger group, had his headquarters SOUTH of the Central Highway.

Miss Chapelle stated that the total Castro Forces during the time she was with them numbered about 6200 to 6300 personnel in uniform. The vast majority were men. They had a number of women doing household chores and administrative work in addition to about thirty (30) riflewomen.

Miss Chapelle stated that not all of the "Fidelistas" were Cubans. About one in ten were from other Latin American countries (Venezuela, Ecuador, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic). Miss Chapelle estimated that of the non-Cubans, seventy-five per cent (75%) were Dominicans who were motivated by the feeling that Trujillo had victimized them.

During the time Miss Chapelle was with the Rebels, she observed five engagements against towns. The pattern of operations of the Castro Forces was to raid isolated Batista Army posts, or fortresses as she called them, for the purpose of obtaining arms. She stated that Castro's arms were not -- as she had thought -- smuggled in. Only about fifteen per cent (15%) had actually been smuggled in. Arms were obtained primarily by raiding. She based her statement on the fact that practically

all the weapons were well worn. If they had been smuggled in they would have been new. She estimated that eighty-five per cent (85%) of the weapons were gained by raids. Among them there were 'a lot' of American weapons including some 30 caliber machine guns and an occasional 50 caliber machine gun. Castro's supporters had been able to manufacture a supply of rudimentary 200 pound mines, an undetermined number of rifle grenades, and a very limited supply of hand made 20 millimeter rounds. The rifle grenades were often faulty and the 20 millimeter rounds were completely ineffective.

Miss Chapelle stated that Castro's tactics were primarily intended to paralyze the transport of Oriente Province by (1) destroying or damaging railroad bridges and (2) establishing roadblocks.

The railroads were more important because they transported sugar cane. First, they wrecked the railroad bridges and then built roadblocks on every road in the vicinity. The roadblocks were established by felling trees or by planting 2 to 4 mines covered by machine guns.

The Rebels stopped every bus, truck, and automobile, turned the passengers out and confiscated the vehicle. The passengers were then escorted on foot to their point of embarkation. Miss Chapelle stated that in the time she was there, she did not see a commercial vehicle moving other than those confiscated by Castro.

Batista's Forces would come out occasionally and attempt to destroy roadblocks, but were not successful. Castro's tactics were to capture a unit, take their arms and release the personnel. Miss Chapelle attributed the lack of success to the fact the Batista Forces could not kill or capture the rebel guerrillas.

Castro Forces became so successful in their actions that Batista finally came to the point where he would not send out any unit of a strength less than several hundred. Batista did not like to send out a unit without a tank or armored car support. The Batista columns usually consisted of a lead jeep, as many trucks as needed for personnel, one tank, one armored car and a tail end jeep.

Primarily, the action taken by Castro against Batista, was against columns of this sort. The Batista columns were trying to reach the isolated fortresses.

Miss Chapelle stated that Castro discouraged the Batista troops from leaving the fortresses in small groups which forced them to make sorties with larger columns. It was during these sorties from the fortresses that the Batista troops would loot and burn houses and that the molestation of women began. Miss Chapelle stated there were stories of all sorts of atrocities committed to impress the local population, which perhaps were not true, but the people believed them.

Miss Chapelle stated that the original idea in occupying these fortresses was that they could be resupplied by air and that garrisons could be relieved. She further stated that the fortresses in some cities were disproportionate to the populace of the community. For example, there might be a garrison of 300 troops in a community with a population of 8,000. Normally, women and children were allowed to enter the fortresses if they desired.

Castro's Forces prevented the majority of resupply air drops and motorized columns from getting through to these fortresses. At the town of La Maya, Miss Chapelle witnessed Castro Forces intercept four consecutive air drops.

During an attack on a fortress, Castro's men kept up fire on the fortress 24 hours a day, preventing entrance or exit. The Rebel Force simply surrounded the fortress and maintained continuous rifle and BAR fire. Miss Chapelle cited an example where the Rebel Force maintained a continuous fire of one round every ten seconds. On occasion a small amount of mortar fire was delivered during these attacks.

According to Miss Chapelle the fortresses withstood attack or siege for from three (3) to seventeen (17) days.

In the case of La Maya, she could not understand why they surrendered when the defenders still had food and water. The total casualties at La Maya were eight (8) dead and thirteen (13) wounded. Among those taken prisoner, there were fifty women and children.

It was Miss Chapelle's opinion that Castro's campaign in Oriente was successful in part because Castro's troops were "willing to fire and keep on firing". His volume of fire was tremendous, while Batista's troops, although better equipped, did not use their weapons effectively.

An example was cited of a Batista relief column for the garrison at La Maya. The Batista column numbered about 500 troops to relieve the garrison of 350 in La Maya (about 8000 population). The column was

sent from Guantanamo (about 45 miles distance) after Castro had intercepted four resupply air drops. The column was comprised of a lead jeep, a tank, an armored car and a number of trucks. The column ran into a Castro roadblock on the Central Highway at what was described as an ideal location for an ambush. Castro's roadblock consisted of about 150 men who had placed two (2) mines at one end of a long curve and two (2) more mines at the other end of the curve. The Castro Commander -- Valle, an ex-traffic clerk for an Export-Import Firm -- planned to attack the column on the curve after detonating the mines at the front and rear of the column. The Rebel Commander was concerned about the alertness of his troops. Instead of a small outpost in front of the roadblock, the commander sent out sixty (60) men with orders to fire and fall back, luring the column inside the mined area.

About 1100, the Batista column appeared and was of the anticipated composition with the exception of air cover by two (2) B-26's, which flew back and forth over the column.

The first volley from the troops in ambush killed the drivers of the lead jeep and the first truck in column. Miss Chapelle stated that if replacement drivers had taken over, the column could have made it since the trucks were not disabled. The troops mounted in the first truck dropped their arms and ran. The other two trucks turned around under the rebel fire and retreated toward Guantanamo. The tank and armored car covered the trucks and withdrew. The aircraft were not used effectively and were kept high by Rebel small arms fire.

At 1400 the casualties at the Rebel outpost were one (1) dead and three (3) wounded. The outpost commander was not congratulated for having stopped a superior force since he did not accomplish his mission of luring the column into the ambush and destroying it.

Miss Chapelle told of her experiences during an attempted airdrop. She had gotten information that a drop would probably take place in the vicinity of a besieged fortress and had gone to the point in the lines where the Commanding Officer of the unit thought the drop would be made. (The drops were normally made outside of the walls of the fortresses). In order to get a good view of the operation she entered a five room house with a thatched roof porch supported by two columns, where there were six rebel volunteers armed with two (2) BAR's and four (4) rifles. The B-26's came in together. One plane took the porch roof off -- cutting the

supports with 50 caliber bullets which resulted in its collapsing. Batista Forces in a blockhouse (outside the fortress) had gotten range of the back room of the five room house containing the rebel soldiers and Miss Chapelle. Miss Chapelle stated at the time she was photographing two of the riflemen, the blinds of the window were being cut away by fire from Batista Forces. The Castro men moved into the remaining rooms and kept up their constant volume of fire.

She emphasized the point that the Castro men, although under heavy fire themselves, did not leave their post but kept up their harassing fire on the fortress and prevented the Batista men from obtaining the airdropped supplies.

Miss Chapelle commented again on the use of B-26's and mentioned the three main questions stated earlier to which she was seeking answers. She stated that during a strafing attack she was normally able to run out and take two photographs of the planes and still had time to take effective cover. The planes were used very unsuccessfully but created a great deal of terror. Sometimes the cities were defended by small arms and sometimes they were not, but there was never any AA fire to combat the planes. Batista pilots were overworked and their tactics very clumsy. She cited an example of a plane strafing the street where bullets were sprayed down the middle instead of on each side where they might have been effective. However ineffective they were, they still created hatred against the United States by the people in the communities.

As regards napalm, Miss Chapelle stated that she had seen napalm used by the U. S. Marine Corps and was familiar with the container and the tear drop pattern of burst. She stated that she saw four (4) used containers in the village of Mayari and she observed the obvious damage caused by these four bombs. She further stated that Batista claimed to have received eight (8) napalm bombs.

In her discussion of the organization of the Castro Forces, Miss Chapelle stated there were only four (4) commissioned ranks (2dLt, 1stLt, Captain and Major). As far as she could determine, there was no difference in rank among the enlisted personnel. She stated that it was a point of pride among the Rebels that there were absolutely no noncommissioned officers -- there were only officers and riflemen.

There were three general groups associated with the Rebels: (1) Fighting Forces, (2) Security Forces, and (3) Civil Resistance Groups.

The Rebel fighting groups usually consisted of about 20 to 40 men with a lieutenant in charge. Miss Chapelle commented that she had questioned a group immediately after the siege of the fortress at Mafu(?) which lasted about three (3) days. The men insisted that no orders had been received from anyone except the lieutenant in charge.

Miss Chapelle stated that about one third of the troops had gone through the Rebel basic training course, which was started by the original twelve (12) Castro men who had been trained in Mexico. Miss Chapelle stated that she had heard the course was then being conducted by two ex-U.S. Marines. The training camp was located at Pico Turquino in the Sierra Maestra.

A Castro man upon joining the cause, sometimes did not get a rifle for the first 6 or 8 weeks -- until he had proved he deserved the weapon -- or until he captured one from a Batista man. It was felt that if a man could endure the privations of Pico Turquino he had the desire and spirit to be a Castro soldier.

As stated above, the usual organization was a 20 to 40 man platoon, however, the BASIC UNIT was what was termed a COLUMN. The column was made up of 400 to 1000 men commanded by a Comandante (Major). The column normally consisted of about 400 men. The column was divided into two (2) groups -- security and assault.

In addition there was another group supporting the column. This third group was not uniformed and had the mission of seeking food, information, weapons, etc. Depending upon their ability to accomplish this mission, they were promoted to either an assault or support group.

Miss Chapelle stated that she had not seen the assault group perform an assault as we know it -- it was the assault group that moved in closest to the objective during the sieges of the fortresses.

Miss Chapelle stated the point about the troops of Castro which she thought should be remembered was their motivation. Almost no one became a Fidelista without first having had some personal or family experience with the Secret Police of Batista. Castro's men had vengeance as their motive. In all cases, the reasons for motivation were personal. The outcome of this was very high morale for the Fidelistas in spite of terrible conditions.

Miss Chapelle stated that Batista destroyed the press of his own country and made "suckers" out of the U. S. press representatives who went there to cover the story.

At this point, Miss Chapelle began showing a series of approximately seventy-five (75) black and white photographs and 35 millimeter color slides which she made while with Castro Forces. Some of her accompanying comments are listed below:

Castro never maintained rear or flank security while operating. He had complete cooperation from the local population.

She saw only three bazookas while with the Rebels and there was no ammunition for them. The photograph shown was a posed shot taken at Fidel Castro's command post.

While showing a photograph of rifle grenades, Miss Chapelle commented that some of the grenades were home made and "hung" on the rifle an undue time after firing. The rifle grenades were made for a four (4) second delay. Some of the mines were also home made by the Civil Resistance Group.

While showing a photograph of a wooden dummy machine gun, reputedly captured in the fall of a government fortress, she stated that she had heard comments to the effect that the U. S. embargo on arms had handicapped Batista's Forces.

While showing a photograph of the Castro brothers, Miss Chapelle stated that of the two brothers, Raul had been more helpful to her in getting her story. This was in spite of the fact that Raul was the more anti-American.

Miss Chapelle, while showing photographs of Rebel casualties, commented that of the casualty figures made public, she believed that Castro's figures were more correct than Batista's. She further stated that all Rebel radio transmissions including casualty figures were made in the clear.

She showed a photograph of the present Minister of the Interior (then Major Rodriguez) visiting a Dominican casualty in a Rebel field hospital. She commented that Rodriguez, prior to joining Castro, had been a newspaper publisher struggling to keep his paper going under the Batista regime but had failed and subsequently spent some time in jail.

Miss Chapelle commented on surgical techniques used in Castro's field hospitals. She mentioned one woman doctor. She further stated that she had not seen such butchery since Iwo Jima; and there was no anesthesia.

Miss Chapelle cited an instance of what might be considered an example of psychological warfare. A Batista column carrying mail to a fortress was stopped and among the letters was one to the garrison commander from his wife. In this letter, the wife stated that the commander "did not love her any more" -- "she needed money for expenses" -- "their son was hurt because he had not written the boy on his birthday" -- and that "although he knew nothing else, he should get out of the profession of arms and do something else". This letter was sent on to the Commander and a politely written note by the Fidelista Commander to the effect that he had sons of his own and that if he (the Batista Commander) would surrender, both of them might be able to see their families. The garrison surrendered shortly thereafter.

Upon completion of showing her photographs, Miss Chapelle invited questions:

The question was asked "how large were the fortresses?".

Miss Chapelle gave the San Luis Fortress as an example. It was a big one -- about 150 yards across the front and 200 yards deep. It also had buildings inside and sandbagged or blockhouse positions protecting the entrance. Troops could move in and out of the blockhouse positions without exposing themselves. The small arms fire from the enemy would not harm them. The amount of artillery was negligible. Sometimes the Fidelistas would have one mortar or sometimes rifle grenades. 129 civilians surrendered from here and out of a total of 350 people, 62 were accused of criminal acts and held. The remainder were turned over to the Red Cross for return. Castro's generosity was due in great part to his inability to feed his prisoners but here again he exercises astute psychology.

Castro would awaken his prisoners about one o'clock in the morning and have them lined up in front of him. Standing with a man holding a torch on either side, Castro would tell the prisoners he bore no malice toward them, that he was setting them free to return to Batista if they desired, only keeping their weapons. If they chose to fight again and were captured, he would again release them as he knew they were being impressed into service by their tyrant Batista. As a result, few prisoners reentered the Batista Forces. Miss Chapelle stated she had heard that most of them were sent to the Isle of Pines.

The question was asked if there was any control of the B-26 aircraft.

Answer: Only Beaver controlled..the Beaver spotted the target for the B-26's.

Question: Where did the troops get their training?

Answer: With the exception of the one-third of the troops mentioned earlier who attended the organized training in the mountains, training was minimal. Marksmanship was not considered nearly as important and very little attention paid to it.

Question: Was there any sort of unit training?

Answer: No. Individual training only -- by one individual to another. Example: In Cipriano's Hole (a term she used for a position during the siege of La Maya) after the order had been given to fire volleys every ten seconds, no one knew what volley fire was. The handling of the rifles was very careless. They were not well cared for and often dirty. An occasional accidental discharge was observed.

Question: How about their officers?

Answer: Those who had been in Mexico were pretty good. This was the original 12 -- the only survivors of the original landing in Oriente. The others knew only what they had learned from fighting in Cuba. Squad tactics were non-existent.

Question: On their motivation. From what you have stated -- people who were active participants were against something or somebody. Was there any positive approach -- any goal given to them?

Answer: It was the same in Cuba as in Algeria. Fidel and his top advisors (approximately 20 men) were professional people. These were the people who could visualize a good government for Cuba and believed they could organize it if they had the opportunity. They were mostly idealist. They did have a good sense of justice. They were proud of the code of justice being prepared by two lawyers who were Fidelistas.

Question: Has this idea of justice been carried out?

Answer: Here Miss Chapelle quoted Castro as saying that he would require all Batista pilots to fly the same number of hours over the same

number of villages dropping candy and baby shoes. Almost half of the Air Force was at present in jail. The hatred against them was terrific, but she did not think they would be shot as Castro did not wish to completely destroy the Cuban Air Force.

Question: Did they use bombs?

Answer: They used fifty pounders. You might have 3 bombs and 3 hours of strafing.

Question: What did they do with prisoners who had committed crimes?

Answer: I was told they were moved by jeep by Castro's Forces to collection points where they were processed and held for justice after the war. Two of Castro's advisors were lawyers with a proud sense of justice.

Question: Back to motivation and the support these forces got through the countryside. What motivated these people?

Answer: The feeling against Batista goes back to at least 1952. At that time, Castro was a wealthy young attorney in Havana. The man had no particular claim to distinction. He ran for Congress but the election was never held. He discovered that among his father's sharecroppers and employees, there was tremendous resentment against Batista in how he distributed this "big piece of cake". "As long as Batista is head, we will never get anything -- no hospitals, no schools, no roads. They felt they were being underpaid. The people of Oriente Province did not have any way to express themselves until Castro came along. Then when the people of the cities became convinced that they were living in a police state, you had two sets of people for the same principles. The people were becoming increasingly frightened. Also, Batista had to contend with a middle class (which is not found anywhere else in Latin America) -- an honest middle class. This group in Cuba was unusually large.

Question: Do you feel that this condition which existed in Oriente Province was any larger than in some other countries which did not have dictators?

Answer: Yes.

Question: What did Batista do to propangandize the people to counteract this feeling?

Answer: I know of no efforts to propangandize.

At this point, Miss Chapelle discussed Castro's background. In Oriente Province on 26 July 1953, Fidel Castro tried to raid the arsenal of the Fortress Macado (?) with about 106 people. The raiders were split into two groups. One group attempted to storm and take over the top floors in which they were successful, -- the other group was to rush the main gate -- Castro led the group on the main gate and his only orders were to watch me and do what I do. So when he started firing to dispose of a sentry, everyone else started firing. The element of surprise was lost. Once the group was inside, no one knew the location of the arsenal. The raid was called off and about 50 got away into cars and fled to the edge of Santiago. Some were killed. She mentioned two names of those who were captured -- Abel and Hadi -- a brother and sister. The brother was tortured and castrated in front of his sister. Both were killed. Word was sent by the Archbishop of the town that if the remainder of the group surrendered, they would be released. They surrendered and were machine gunned. Miss Chapelle stated that it was here the legend about Castro began... After Castro had fallen to avoid the machine gun fire, a Batista officer pointed a revolver at Castro's head and was about to fire when Castro said, "You may kill me but you cannot kill what I stand for". The officer did not shoot him. Castro was tried and sentenced to 15 years and later released by Batista on amnesty.

Castro's second attempt to start a revolt was in 1956 when, with 82 people on a vessel with a capacity for 20, he tried to invade Cuba on the coast south of Santiago. At 1000 on 30 November, Fidel was held up. He was to have been assisted by supporters within the City of Santiago. Castro was 48 hours late for the projected amphibious landing. The result -- 82% casualties, only 12 men surviving.

Miss Chapelle continued, "In view of these attempts, it was obvious what Batista was up against."

It was common practice for Batista forces to capture Rebel bands in those days -- murder and butcher them -- and make sure their mutilated bodies were found the next day on the streets".

Question: Did you get the impression that this was a cumulative affair?
Answer: Our own diplomatic representatives complained to Batista more than once of proven cases of atrocities. The Secret Police that had been organized for minor duties had gotten out of hand as far as atrocities were concerned. The Army copies the methods used by the Secret Police.

Question: Apparently in the recent trials there were a lot of Army people involved?

Answer: Yes. A lot of the SIM people got away.
(Servicio Inteligencia Militar)

Question: Apparently there were several groups of Castro Forces. Two main groups led by Fidel and Raul. Who had this group over in Havana and the groups throughout the country?

Answer: In every community there should have been 3 groups. The military people, the militia (the counter terrorism people) and the Civil Relief Organization which included a tremendous number of civilians. On 21 December, military groups of 2 separate columns were organized in 5 different provinces.

Question: How were they organized after the initial undertaking?

Answer: I have the general impression that people were pretty surprised to discover that there was a cell over in the other village. They did not realize the extent to which they were associated in this movement. The Batista Forces were already in the cities. Everything was done right under their noses.

Question: Were reprisals taken against them when discovered? Did the local populace sympathize with Castro?

Answer: I am sure they did. Castro had promised not to loot and rape.

Question: Where did the money come from for Rebel purchases?

Answer: They had group funds only, as far as she knew. The lieutenant in charge of a particular group handled all the money. There was no pay for the troops.

Question: How did they maintain good relations with the civilian population?

Answer: They said, "your women are safe -- we will not loot, but you must give us information".

Question: What do you believe Castro's primary motivation was?

Answer: It was originally vengeance..the stabilizing force. He believed that he had watched his friends getting killed under rather dramatic circumstances.

Question: There was no evidence of a "pitched" battle between forces?

Answer: No.

Question: Was the Batista soldier's lack of motivation -- because he did not like Batista or because he did not want to get killed?

Answer: Y u must remember that Batista was quite a hero one generation ago. His present enlisted men were not the men to whom he had been a hero. Many of them believed the rebel stories about all the money held by Batista.

Here she mentioned Tabernilla as being head of the military and how she had been under the impression (from reports) he was head of smuggling in Cuba.

Question: In other words, there was no discipline in the Cuban Army. If the Commanding Officer said fight, would they fight?

Answer: They would fight as long as the NCO's could retain control over them but once the NCO faltered, all discipline was lost.

Batista did issue a very demoralizing order after the return of the first prisoners by Castro. Batista issued an order that any man in his forces could shoot his immediate inferior if he heard him discuss surrender.

Miss Chapelle talked with one "turn coat" warrant officer -- through another "turn coat" lieutenant colonel. Just the two men and herself. There were no Castro men present.

She asked the warrant officer why he came over to Castro's Forces. He replied that he had been given an order which he could not execute in good conscience -- to round up any ten Castro sympathizers and shoot them, then to make sure the local populace knew that he had killed them. This he did not do, but wired Havana the following morning that he had. But he learned that an Army Inspector was coming and he knew he would be discovered and had to get out in a hurry.

She also asked this warrant officer if he would sign a statement giving the name of his superior who had signed the order. His reply was that he would not since he knew that his superior was acting under orders from someone higher up.

Question: Did Castro have a Staff?

Answer: I could not find anyone with a definite responsibility. There were about 20 people around him all the time who executed his orders. Responsibilities were not divided -- i.e., G-1, 2, 3 and 4. Anyone could be assigned any task. It appeared to me that Castro and his mistress ran the show themselves.

Question: You said you saw napalm?

Answer: I saw four containers at Mayari Village. I had seen them before. Here she described the containers and where she had seen them. Incidentally, this Mayari Village adjoined the Castro properties.

Question: I have read that Castro's men in Mexico were trained by Colonel Bayo, ex-Spanish Republican Army, now in exile in Mexico. Do you know if this is correct?

Answer: No, I have no personal knowledge of Castro's actions in Mexico.

Question: Re Raul's relationship with Fidel? Is there a rift between the two?

Answer: Just that there is the younger brother who has seen his brother become a hero -- he would like a little of the glory. The relationship was good until the capture by Raul of the Americans. When the Americans were returned without harm -- relations were patched up.

Here she stated again that Raul had been sent to the northern part of the highway with the smaller force and had not been considered too important, but Raul did very well militarily with that small force. When the two forces consolidated, there were no differences.

She stated that Fidel had given Raul as his share of the victory the Department of Education in the new government, which means that if Raul does have political ideas against the U.S., he is in a good position to do the U. S. harm.

At this point a summary of what had been said was requested in order to establish a pattern of Castro's methods.

Miss Chapelle stated that when Fidel landed, there were only 12 survivors. They fled to the mountains and were supported for months by a wealthy planter. Castro sent word back into Santiago that he wanted more men and arms. Volunteers came up. At first there were only actions against small patrols, then they began to capture small posts. The young people of Santiago responded very quickly -- soon the Rebels had 80 armed men, armed with only hunting weapons but very effective hunting weapons. There were no vigorous efforts by Batista at this time to wipe out this movement. Batista made the mistake of sending large groups of massed troops against rebels. Batista lost his first campaign because troops were massed and on the road. He made an effort to ring Pico Turquino and keep moving in on it. Ambushes by Castro knocked this movement out.

Castro's combat intelligence was terrific. Batista had no counter intelligence in those early phases.

Question: What kept someone from going in under a pretext as a Castro man and disposing of Castro?

Answer: Here Miss Chapelle stated that the security precautions were absolutely fantastic.

Question: What happened to the turn coat warrant officer you previously mentioned?

Answer: He had been told that they would sneak his family out before Batista got them...(wife and two children). They would then send him to Bonis() to conduct training. The warrant officer was to be the third person with training responsibilities up there.

Question: Do you think Nye is guilty?

Answer: I don't know anything about him, but it is logical.

Question: Re Castro and American relations.

Answer: Nothing strikes me as being more out of key than what I saw. Americans in Oriente were pro-Castro. The term "American Maumau" was used quite often. The resentment on the part of the Americans was such that they were very helpful. Of course, the workers were pro-Castro which made it difficult for the boss to be pro-Batista.

Miss Chapelle cited an incident of a U. S. company losing vehicles. Two armed Castro men confronted the American official in charge. He asked them to hold their guns on him so that he could tell the truth about the confiscation of vehicles, but the rebels also took the fire vehicle which he had requested them not to take, and as a result, the plant had to close down due to the danger of continuing operations.

Question: Re overall casualties during the Castro movement.

Answer: She stated that during the entire campaign there were not over 500 casualties among Castro's men. And she did not think there were over 500 casualties in Batista's forces.

Question: To your knowledge, did Batista take any prisoners?

Answer: I spoke to five people who had been arrested in civilian clothes. I never spoke to anyone who said he had been captured or surrendered. There was to my knowledge (according to what she had heard) only one rebel captain surviving of those captured.

Question: Batista Forces actually did take him alive?

Answer: Yes. Three men were killed and he was not, during an ambush. Miss Chapelle made the statement that she had heard talk of trying to rescue him before he was shot.

Miss Chapelle made the statement that at Santa Clara, Batista claimed three (3) thousand rebel dead. This was not true. Rebel casualties were 70. This was the bloodiest of all actions. She stated that she saw maybe 50 Rebels lose their lives in the five battles which she witnessed.

At this point Miss Chapelle was questioned as to her opinion of Castro's intentions toward the Dominican Republic and Haiti.

She voiced the opinion that the situation in the Dominican Republic is similar to what Cuba was in the beginning, and cited as an example the slowing down of information coming from Cuba -- then the revolution. Now the information is spotty from the Dominican Republic. She stated possibly the Dominicans are reasoning that they are being ruled by a dictator. She has the feeling that due to the recent meeting between

Duvalier and Trujillo, that Trujillo is nervous and might ask Haitians to assist him on his flank. The absence of news from the Dominican Republic means, if it means what it did in Cuba, that the situation is bad. She stated that she had been assigned to keep her finger on this professionally as well as personally.

Question: Re Dominicans fighting with Castro Forces, -- could these Dominicans form a nucleus for a revolution in the Dominican Republic?

Answer: Replied that nucleus was a good word. There seemed to be a feeling that when Castro was through in Cuba, he would go over and help the Dominicans who had been fighting with them. She reiterated that there were possibly one in ten persons in Castro's forces who were not Cuban. Possibly 600 out of 6200 non-Cubans with maybe three-quarters of these Dominicans. The others were from other Latin American countries -- Ecuador, Argentina, Venezuela, etc.

She stated that there were a few Americans also in Castro's Forces. Some with the idea that it is more important to do something about terrorism than it is to have a particular national allegiance.

Question: How do you think Castro will feel about taking a back seat?

Answer: It must be very hard for him to take a back seat. He has found the position of revolutionary leader very nice. I think that he considers himself an enemy of dictatorships and is likely to start another revolution. He considers himself another Simon Bolivar.

This concludes the resume of Miss Chapelle's comments.

5. It may be concluded from Miss Chapelle's remarks that Fidel Castro's concept of guerrilla tactics and operations is rudimentary, and consisted chiefly of harassment of Batista Forces which were ineffective in combat. The strength of the 26th of July movement was basically found in the motivation of its members and Castro's personal magnetism. Although the movement was successful in achieving its immediate aims, it would appear that the revolution was primarily won by default and the inability of Batista to initiate aggressive counteraction within his military establishment.

6. Although there now exists what might be termed an experienced nucleus of Dominican guerrillas, it is questionable whether Castro would be able to exert the same personal leadership and demand the same personal loyalty in an attempt to lead a similar movement composed of Dominican Nationals against Generalissimo Trujillo.

LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR.

Copy to:

✓ACofS for Intelligence (Army)
ACofS, Intelligence (Air Force)
ACofS, G-2, HQMC

NY 109-112

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

of the Province of Havana, and that in order to placate FAURE CHOMON the Cuban Government was going to offer him one of the mayorships of Havana, Cuba, replacing JOSE LLANUSA, who is the former Secretary of Organization of the July 26th Movement.

██████████ on 3/16/59 advised that she had spoken to ██████████ on 3/15/59 and ██████████ stated that the rumor concerning CHOMON becoming a mayor of Havana was not true, but ██████████ did not elaborate.

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For the information of the Bureau and Miami, WALTER WINCHELL, well known syndicated columnist, on his radio broadcast from NY on 3/15/59 stated that despite denials by FIDEL CASTRO, a liberation army was being organized to invade the Dominican Republic and that plans for these landings have been delayed by differences, and that Venezuela is opposed to FIDEL CASTRO's cooperation with Dominican Communists.

WINCHELL also stated in this broadcast that FIDEL CASTRO's troubles are beginning and that an underground movement against CASTRO is spreading. WINCHELL stated that the new rebels opposed to CASTRO have connections inside CASTRO's top ranks. WINCHELL also stated that the Communists now control 25 out of 29 labor unions in Cuba. WINCHELL further said that he was told not to be surprised if the CASTRO Government is completely overthrown within the next six weeks.

WINCHELL also had an item in his 3/15/59 broadcast from Santiago de Cuba where 25 young men had been arrested and were charged with an attempt to seize arms and a yacht for an expedition to the Dominican Republic.

JACK ANDERSON, who substituted for DREW PEARSON on the 3/15/59 DREW PEARSON broadcast, stated that PEARSON was at the present time touring the Caribbean getting information on possible revolution in that area.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NY 109-112

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ANDERSON stated that DREW PEARSON had sent a cable from San Juan, Puerto Rico, regarding FIDEL CASTRO and stated that CASTRO had a problem in that he, CASTRO, has a large number of troops in Havana and that he, CASTRO, has an ambition to be a leader of the Caribbean islands and Central America. PEARSON, in this cable to ANDERSON, stated that CASTRO forces will land in Haiti on 3/31/59 at a point 50 miles from Cuba and that a bloody battle would be fought in the mountains between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. PEARSON also stated in this cable that the United States was on the spot because of the Pan American Union and that the whole Caribbean area was about ready to boil over.

ALFREDO HERNANDEZ VALDES, former Cuban Consul General, New York City, telephonically contacted the NYO on 3/17/59 and stated that he has information from reliable sources in Havana to the effect that the CASTRO Government will not be able to last until the end of April, 1959. HERNANDEZ was reluctant to discuss this matter at length over the telephone and advised that he would see SA FRANCIS J. O'BRIEN within a few days and furnish additional information regarding this matter. (u)

Lieutenant [redacted] BSS, NYCPD, on 3/16/59 advised that the NYCPD had been told that in connection with CASTRO's visit to Washington on 4/17/59 CASTRO was scheduled to come to NYC and would speak before the UN on 4/20/59. The NYO is desirous of conducting an interview with [redacted] but an interview at this time may jeopardize Mrs. TAAFFE. As soon as an opportunity presents itself to interview [redacted] this interview will be conducted by the NYO in an attempt to obtain additional information concerning the political situation in Cuba and any alleged plans for invasions in the Caribbean area which might originate from Cuba.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

_____, 1959

<input type="checkbox"/>	Name Check Unit - Room 6523
<input type="checkbox"/>	Service Unit - Room 6524
<input type="checkbox"/>	Forward to File Review
<input type="checkbox"/>	Attention <u>Martin</u>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Return to <u>Marcia</u> <u>1521</u>
	Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:

- ☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☒ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☐ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
☐ Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

- ☒ Restricted to Locality of Cuba; Haiti
☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations
☐ Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

 Subject _____
 Birthdate _____
 Address _____
b6
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Localities _____

 R# _____ Date 3-18 Searcher Initials lb
 FILE NUMBER SERIAL

	<u>NP</u>
<u>NI</u>	<u>100</u> <u>366303</u>
<u>NI</u>	<u>140-15470-4 p #17</u>
	<u>NP</u>
<u>I</u>	<u>113</u> <u>1-210-13</u> <u>dent</u>
<u>NI</u>	<u>100</u> <u>779383</u> <u>no locality</u>
	<u>NP</u>

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 DATE 4/8/99 BY 60267MS/BJE/VOL

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reporting Office MEXICO, D. F.	Office of Origin BUREAU	Date 3/4/59	Investigative Period 2/27-3/4/59
TITLE OF CASE FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA		Report made by G. LONG, A. LUNRO	Typed By: mar
		CHARACTER OF CASE FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS	

Synopsis:

[Cuban Embassy, Mexico City, taken over on 1/1/59 by 26th of July Movement leaders.] Acting Cuban Consul stated that he expected approximately 3,000 Cuban exiles in Mexico to return to Cuba. Meeting sponsored by "Mexican Association of Friends of Cuba", a Communist dominated group, held in Mexico City 1/25/59 to demonstrate support for the new Cuban Revolutionary Government. Cuban Government sponsored delegation visited Mexico City 2/12-17/59. Mass meeting honoring delegation held 2/16/59 in Nuevo Teatro Ideal in Mexico City. NPPK leaders JUAN JUANES and LAULA FENESES de ALBIZU CAMPOS traveled from Mexico City to Havana, Cuba, 2/9/59 and were expected to return in early March, 1959.

EXP. PROC.

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DATE 11-11-2011 BY 60320 NLS/BCE/KAB~~

P

Special Agent in Charge	Do not write in spaces below	
6 - Bureau (109-420)	109-420-210-460	REC-17
1 - U.S. Embassy and City (Circulation)	MAR 11 1959	EX-136 b7E
1 - Mexico City (109-70)		

50 MAR 27 1959

100 - Havana
3-18-59
DATE FORW.
HOW FORW.
BY

1 photo - NY + Miami
3-19-59

This report is loaned to you by the FBI, and neither it nor its contents are to be distributed outside the agency to which loaned.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : Legal Attache, Havana (66-101)

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE SURVEY - CUBA

DATE: March 19, 1959

In lieu of monthly Intelligence Survey - Cuba, for March, 1959, report captioned FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA has been submitted.

2 - Bureau
1 - Havana
JTH:lg
(3)

4/8/99 60267NS/BCE/HOB

EX-107

REC-29

109-12-210-

462

18 MAR 24 1959

APR 5 1959

LONGHENT

NAT. INT. SEC.

Nasca

SAC, New York (109-46)

March 23, 1959

REC- 15

Director, FBI (109-480)

464

F 1002

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
IS - CUBA

Reurairtel 3/5/59 with enclosure.

Information contained in the enclosure indicated that [redacted] a registered Dominican agent, stated that the Castro Government would be overthrown by the end of March, 1959, and that Dr. Antonio "Tony" Varona would be coalition Government's choice for the presidency. Information was also contained in the enclosure that Faure Chomon was planning a coup to overthrow the Castro Government.

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b7C

On 3/18/59 Legat, Havana, advised that it was a common rumor in Havana that Antonio Varona was plotting to become president. Havana advised that [redacted] and other office sources stated, however, that Castro was too strong among the people at the present time for a coup to take place. Havana also advised that according to PSI [redacted] Faure Chomon was cooperating with the July 26 Movement and expected to be named mayor of Havana. This source stated, however, that Chomon was not to be trusted and would attack Castro if the opportunity presented itself.


b6
b7C
b7D

The above is for your information.

1 - Miami

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VHN:jlw



66 MAR 27 1959

MAIL ROOM ☒

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

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Belmont ✓
Mohr ✓
Nease ✓
Parsons ✓
Rosen ✓
Tamm ✓
Trotter ✓
W.C. Sullivan ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Holloman ✓
Gandy ✓

☐ Airgram

SECRET

☒ XX

Cablegram

DeLoach ✓
McGuire ✓
W.C. Sullivan ✓

URGENT 3-18-59

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LEGAT, HAVANA NO. 636

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTER - CUBA. REBUCAB MARCH 13 LAST. COMMON RUMOR HERE THAT ANTONIO VARONA PLOTTING TO BECOME PRESIDENT. [] AND OTHER OFFICE SOURCES STATE HOWEVER CASTRO TOO STRONG AMONG PEOPLE AT PRESENT FOR COUP TO TAKE PLACE. ACCORDING TO PSI [] FAURE CHOMON COOPERATING WITH JULY 26 AND EXPECTS TO BE NAMED MAYOR OF HAVANA. SAME SOURCE STATED HOWEVER CHOMON NOT TO BE TRUSTED AND WILL ATTACK CASTRO IF OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF.] X

DECLASSIFIED BY SP8 Mac/rude
ON 5-23-94 (3FK)

JAMES T. HAVERTY

*POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANT

RECEIVED: 3-18-59 11:20 AM HL

REC-15
EX-102

23 MAR 24 1959

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211326

SECRET

109-12-210

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

b6
b7C
b7D

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cc: Mr Belmont
cc: Mr Roach

109-12-210-466

CHANGED TO

109-590-6X

JUN 11 1959

MB

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DATE 4/8/99 BY 60267 NLS/BCE/BB

C

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

TELETYPE

URGENT 3-25-59 3-23 PM JLD
TO DIRECTOR, FBI 6
FROM SAC, NEW YORK

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES, FPM DASH CUBA. RE NY TEL MARCH
TWENTY FIVE INSTANT BY TEL THREE TWO FOUR FIVE NINE. MRS. CATHERINE
TAAFFE ADVISED SHE RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL FROM [REDACTED] ASSOCIA
OF DR. ANTONIO QUOTE

TONY UNQUOTE VARONA, FORMER CUBAN SENATOR AND ASSOCIATE OF CARLOS
PRIO, WHO RETURNED TO NYC LAST EVENING. [REDACTED] TOLD TAAFFE THAT
HE HAD JUST RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT FIDEL CASTRO IS BUILDING UP
RESENTMENT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND BLAMING AMERICANS AND THE
U.S. FOR THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENTS AGAINST HIS GOVERNMENT BY
STATING THAT THE U.S. IS DOING NOTHING TO STOP THIS REACTIONARY
ACTIVITY. [REDACTED] STATED THAT HIS SOURCE SAID THAT THIS ATTACK
AGAINST THE U.S. IS ONLY A PRELUDE TO AN OFFICIAL REQUEST TO
WITHDRAW ALL PERSONNEL AND CLOSE THE NAVAL BASE AT GUANTANAMO BAY,
ORIENTE, CUBA. TAAFFE STATED THAT [REDACTED] DID NOT DISCLOSE HIS
SOURCE BUT IT IS HER UNDERSTANDING THAT [REDACTED] BEST SOURCE IS
WITHIN THE CUBAN CONSULATE IN NYC. MAIL COPY SENT MIAMI.

CORR LINE FIFTEEN WORD EIGHT SHLD BE [REDACTED]
END AND ACK PLS

R NY 6 UA CRA

ORIG. MR. BELMONT FOR DIRECTOR

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

b6
b7C

DECODED COPY

Tolson ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr ✓
Nease ✓
Parsons ✓
Rosen ✓
Tamm ✓
Trotter ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Holloman ✓
Gandy ✓

☐ Airgram

☒ Cablegram

URGENT 3-31-59

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LEGAT, HAVANA

NO. 639

220740
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 5/24/93 BY SP-1 (SK) / PSK

DeLoach ✓
McGuire ✓
W.C. Sullivan ✓
D. Malone

CUBAN POLITICAL MATTERS, IS - CUBA. REBUCAB MARCH 30.
JOSE FIGUERES CAME AS GUEST OF REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT
MARCH 20. BOTH FIGUERES AND FIDEL CASTRO PRINCIPAL SPEAKERS
AT TELEVISED MASS RALLY HELD EVENING OF MARCH 22 IN HAVANA
CALLED BY CONFEDERACION DE TRABAJADORES CUBANOS (CTC).
FIGUERES SPOKE OF PERILS THAT FACE CUBAN REVOLUTION AND
MENTIONED CUBA SHOULD BE ALIGNED WITH WEST IN CRUCIAL
STRUGGLE BETWEEN FREE WORLD AND SOVIET SYSTEM. DAVID SALVADOR,
SECRETARY GENERAL OF CTC, INTERRUPTED HIM CLAIMING CUBA NOW
SOVEREIGN AND DID NOT HAVE TO SIDE WITH UNITED STATES IN ANY
WAR. CASTRO FOLLOWED FIGUERES AS SPEAKER AND STATED HE DIS-
AGREED WITH HIM. CASTRO ATTACKED QUOTE "MONOPOLISTIC PRESS
SERVICES" UNQUOTE CLAIMING THEY DID NOT TELL TRUTH REGARDING
REVOLUTION. CLAIMED ARMS BEING OBTAINED IN FLORIDA BY COUNTER
REVOLUTIONARIES AND THAT FBI HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO FIND EVEN A
PISTOL THERE. HE ATTACKED INTERNATIONAL OLIGARCHY AS ENEMY OF
CUBA AND DENIED IT WAS NECESSARY TO TAKE SIDES IN ANY WORLD
CONFLICT. PRESS ATTACHE HERE STATES UPI GAVE FULL COVERAGE TO
SPEECH AND AP GAVE PARTIAL COVERAGE IN U S TO THESE REMARKS.
ALL HAVANA NEWSPAPERS CARRIED COMMENTS RE STATEMENTS MADE BY
FIGUERES AND CASTRO. BUREAU ADVISED BY CABLE MARCH 7 THAT CASTRO
HAD PUBLICLY STATED COUNTER REVOLUTIONARIES PURCHASING ARMS IN

REC-39

EX-136

F97
60 APR 7 1959

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

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Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Nease _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
W.C. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

☐ **Airgram**

☒ **Cablegram**

PAGE TWO, FROM LEGAT, HAVANA NO. 639

MIAMI WITHOUT ANY INTERFERENCE FROM FBI.

JAMES T. HAVERTY

RECEIVED: 3-31-59 1:31 PM CWA

1 - Orig. 1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Yellow 1 - Mr. Nasca
1 - Liaison

3-30-59

CODE

CABLEGRAM

URGENT (VIA LEASED WIRE)

TO LEGAL ATTACHE HAVANA

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

4/8/99 6026116/60E1612
CUBAN POLITICAL MATTERS, IS DASH CUBA. ON DREW PEARSON'S BROADCAST MARCH TWENTYNINE, LAST, HE REPORTED EX-PRESIDENT FIGUERES OF COSTA RICA MADE SPEECH STATING QUOTE WHILE WE ARE DOING GREAT THINGS IN LATIN AMERICA, WE HAVE TO REMEMBER THAT OUR GREAT FRIEND, THE UNITED STATES, IS ENGAGED IN A DEADLY STRUGGLE WITH RUSSIA. IT IS A STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY AND WE HAVE TO SUPPORT THE UNITED STATES. END QUOTE CASTRO ALLEGEDLY REPLIED QUOTE I HATE TO DIFFER WITH MY HONORED FRIEND FROM COSTA RICA BUT LATIN AMERICANS SHOULD NOT GET MIXED UP IN THIS DISPUTE. IF THERE SHOULD BE WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES, CUBA WOULD REMAIN NEUTRAL. END QUOTE PEARSON STATED MOST AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS DID NOT PUBLISH THIS INFORMATION. SUCAB FACTS RE THESE ALLEGED STATEMENTS

REC- 58

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (detached)

NOTE:

25 APR 1 1959

ENC. 469 BY

OK 2019-2041 BY

The Bureau has received information to the effect, that there is a rift between Figueres and Castro. Figueres is reported to have failed in his recent visit to Cuba to convince Castro that Castro's movement is supporting irresponsible communist groups.

WVC:ef

(6)

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UPI-5

(CASTRO)

SEVERAL LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMATS FRIENDLY TO THE UNITED STATES VOICED HOPE TODAY VICE-PRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON WILL HAVE A HEART-TO-HEART CHAT WITH CUBAN PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO DURING HIS UNOFFICIAL VISIT HERE APRIL 17.

THESE DIPLOMATS, WHO DID NOT WANT TO BE IDENTIFIED, ARE DISTURBED OVER CASTRO'S GROWING HOSTILITY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES, ESPECIALLY HIS RECENT STATEMENT THAT CUBA WOULD REMAIN NEUTRAL IN THE EVENT OF WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA.

THEY BELIEVE THAT A FORTHRIGHT TALK BETWEEN NIXON AND THE CUBAN LEADER MIGHT GO A LONG WAY TOWARD DISPELLING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

CASTRO IS DUE TO COME HERE AT THE INVITATION OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS TO ADDRESS ITS ANNUAL MEETING. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS SAID PUBLICLY THAT CASTRO "WILL ASSUREDLY BE WELCOME HERE."

BUT MANY U.S. OFFICIALS ARE KNOWN TO BE COOL TOWARD THE VISIT. THEY WANT CASTRO'S APPOINTMENTS WITH HIGH OFFICIALS KEPT TO A MINIMUM.

THE LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMATS SAID IT WOULD BE A GRAVE MISTAKE FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO SNUB CASTRO, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE UNITED STATES IS STILL UNDER FIRE FOR BEING TOO FRIENDLY WITH LATIN AMERICAN DICTATORS.

CASTRO FEELS THAT THE LAST TWO U.S. AMBASSADORS TO CUBA UNDER THE REGIME OF FULGENCIO BATISTA WERE OVERLY FRIENDLY TO THE OUSTED PRESIDENT. HE SAYS THIS IS THE BIG OBSTACLE TO MORE FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA.

~~ACCORDING TO THE LATIN AM~~

ACCORDING TO THE LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMATS, THIS IS WHERE NIXON COULD BE MOST USEFUL.

3/29--W0320P

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